MĪMĀMSĀ PARIBHĀṢĀ

OF

KṚSṆA YAJVAN

Swāmī Mādhavānanda

Advaita Ashrama

MĪMĀṂSĀ-PARIBHĀṢĀ

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Translated and annotated
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PUBLISHER'S NOTE

Mīmāṁsā-Paribhāṣā was first translated and annotated by Swami Madhavananda of revered memory. He became the ninth President of the Ramakrishna Math and the Ramakrishna Mission. A profound scholar, he has translated a number of Sanskrit scriptures into English, his *magnum opus* being the translation of the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* with the commentary of Śaṅkarācārya. There are several other translations of Sanskrit treatises by him, all published by us.

In his learned 'Foreword' to this rare but popular treatise on this subject, the translator has pointed out its importance in the study of the Mīmāṁsā (more correctly, Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā) system of Indian Philosophy. There is hardly any more useful information that can be added by us.

The first edition of this book was published by the Ramakrishna Mission Saradapitha, Belur Math. It was long out of print. At our request, the present authorities of the Saradapitha have accorded permission to us to bring out this second edition, for which our grateful thanks are due to them.

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ABBREVIATIONS

Ṛ-V.	Ṛg-Veda
Tan. Vār.	Tantra-Vārttika
Tāṇ. Br.	Tāṇḍya Brāhmaṇa
Tai. Ā.	Taittirīya Āraṇyaka
Tai. Br.	Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa
Tai. S.	Taittirīya Śaṁhitā
Mai. S.	Maitrāyaṇī Saṁhitā
n.	Note
Pū. Mī. Sū.	Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā Sūtras
Rām.	Rāmāyaṇa
Vāj. S.	Vājasaneya Saṁhitā
Sat. Br.	Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa
Ṣaḍ. Br.	Ṣaḍviṁśa Brāhmaṇa

FOREWORD

The Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā is one of the six systems of Hindu philosophy which have come down to us from hoary antiquity. They fall into three groups, viz., Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika, Sāṁkhya and Yoga, Mīmāṁsā and Vedānta. Each has its special field of inquiry, where it zealously defends its findings, but in other matters it is content to borrow from the others. The word *pūrva* means initial, and *mīmāṁsā*, a reasoned conclusion. The system is so called because it aims at a rational settlement of the doubtful points in the initial or ritualistic portion (*karma-kāṇḍa*) of the Vedas, while the Uttara-Mīmāṁsā or Vedānta deals with their final or philosophical portion (*jñāna-kāṇḍa*), consisting of the Upaniṣads.

Some millenniums ago, sacrifices to different deities formed a very important part of the religious life of the cultured sections in India, and for a proper performance of them the Mīmāṁsā was indispensable. Even to-day it has great influence over Hindu society, inasmuch as the Vedas and Smrtis, which prescribe religious duties for the Hindus, as also Hindu law, are interpreted according to the tenets of the Mīmāṁsā. But as its speculative side was intended to serve the purpose of rituals, it is neither comprehensive nor very convincing as a philosophy.

According to the Mīmāṁsā (as also the Vedānta), the Vedas are eternal, being only revealed to certain *ṛṣis* or seers. As such they are free from human defects, and their authority is unquestionable. The Mīmāṁsā goes so far as to say that even words are eternal and their meanings fixed. Unlike the Nyāya, both systems regard knowledge as self-valid, that is, as carrying conviction of its truth unless invalidated later. But the Mīmāṁsā is sharply at variance with the Vedānta both in its objective and method. For it is an inquiry into righteous action (*dharma*); it believes in a real objective universe as well as in a plurality of selves, although these are admitted as eternal and omnipresent; and it glorifies heaven, to which the performance of rituals is held to be the way. But the Vedānta in its highest or monistic phase is an inquiry into Brahman or the Supreme Reality; it looks upon the whole phenomenal world as illusory; and it exhorts us to strive for Liberation, consisting in the realisation of our essential oneness with Brahman, through knowledge, to which devotion and selfless work are indirect helps. The whole emphasis of the Mīmāṁsā is on the mechanical performance of rites, and it has no use for God as the author of the periodical manifestation and dissolution (*sṛṣṭi* and *pralaya*) of the world, nor does it believe in them.

The basic work on the Mīmāṁsā is the *Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā Sūtras*, or Aphorisms, of Jaimini (probably 200 B.C.), which has been commented on by Sabara Svāmin. Two other illustrious thinkers, Kumārila Bhatta and Prabhākara—the latter supposed to be a pupil of the former—have written expositions on this work and have come to found two distinct schools of this system. Subsequent writers on the Mīmāṁsā have more or less elaborated the views of these two masters, notably Kumārila, who tried to bring the Mīmāṁsā as close as possible to the Vedānta.

Some knowledge of the canons of the Mīmāṁsā is essential for an understanding of the philosophical literature of India. The *Mīmāṁsā-Paribhāṣā,* which means, "A lucid exposition of the Mīmāṁsā," is the smallest popular treatise on the subject. Very little is known of its author, Kṛṣṇa Yajvan; but his book, setting forth some of the salient ritualistic principles of the system, culled from Jaimini's *Sūtras,* is a veritable boon for beginners. Somewhat more comprehensive is the *Artha-Saṁgraha* by Laugākṣi Bhāskara, and still more so is the *Mīmāṁsā-Nyāya-Prakāśa* (or *Āpadevī*) by Anantadeva. Of these, the former has got two English translations, but the *Mīmāṁsā-Paribhāṣā* has none. Hence the present attempt.

In preparing this edition, I have received substantial help from the excellent edition with two Sanskrit commentaries by Professor D. T. Tātācārya Siromaṇi of the Sanskrit College, Tiruvadi (Tanjore). I am also indebted to Mahāmahopādhyāya A. Cinnasvāmi Śāstrī, Professor of the Mīmāṁsā and Vedānta in the Calcutta University, as also to Paṇḍita Pañcānana Śāstrī Tarka-Sāṁkhya-Vedānta-tīrtha of the Yogendra Catuṣpāṭhī and the Ramakrishna Mission Institute of Culture, Calcutta, for helping to clear some doubts. For the text I have consulted, besides the edition named above, the Nirṇaya-sāgara edition of Bombay, the Chaukhamba Sanskrit Series and another edition of Benares, and three editions published in Calcutta. Valuable information on the intricacies of Vedic sacrifices has been obtained from the *Yajña-kathā*, in Bengali, by the late Principal Rāmendra Sundara Trivedī.

The translation has been made faithful and reasonably literal. Copious notes have been given to elucidate the text, which has been divided into sections with suitable headings, and references have been given to a good many of the quotations. An Index also has been added. It is hoped that the book will fulfil a real need of the English-knowing students of Indian philosophies.

Belur Math, MĀDHAVĀNANDA
November, 1948.

KEY TO TRANSLITERATION AND PRONUNCIATION

		Sounds like			*Sounds like*
अ	a	o in *son*	ड	ḍ	d
आ	ā	ah	ढ	ḍh	dh in *godhead*
इ	i	i short	ण	ṇ	n
ई	ī	ee	त	t	French t
उ	u	u in *full*	थ	th	th in *thumb*
ऊ	ū	oo in *boot*	द	d	th in *then*
ऋ	ṛ	ri (almost)	ध	dh	theh in *breathe here*
ए	e	e in *bed*	न	n	n
ऐ	ai	y in *my*	प	p	p
ओ	o	oh	फ	ph	ph in *loop-hole*
औ	au	ow in *now*	ब	b	b
क	k	k	भ	bh	bh in *abhor*
ख	kh	ckh in *blockhead*	म	m	m
ग	g	g hard	य	y	y
घ	gh	gh in *log-hut*	र	r	r
ङ	ṅ	ng	ल	l	l
च	c	ch (not k)	व	v	w
छ	ch	chh in *catch him*	श	ś	sh
ज	j	j	ष	ṣ	sh (almost)
झ	jh	dgeh in *hedgehog*	स	s	s
ञ	ñ	n (somewhat)	ह	h	h
ट	ṭ	t	ं	ṁ	ng
ठ	ṭh	th in *ant-hill*	ः	ḥ	half h

MĪMĀṀSĀ-PARIBHĀṢĀ

INTRODUCTORY

सूर्यनारायणं वन्दे देवीं त्रिपुरसुन्दरीम् ।
गुरूनधिगतार्थांश्च निरन्तरमहं भजे ॥ १ ॥
बालानां शास्त्रसिद्धार्थलेशबोधाय धीमता ।
मीमांसापरिभाषेयं क्रियते कृष्णयज्वना ॥ २ ॥

1. I bow to Sūryanārāyaṇa and Tripurasundarī Devī,[1] and also bow constantly to my teachers, who[2] were well versed in different subjects.

2. For the understanding by boys of a few[3] of the principles established in the (Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā) system, this *Mīmāṁsā-Paribhāṣā* (compendium) is being composed by the learned[4] Kṛṣṇa Yajvan.

[[1] Presumably the parents of the author. The words, meaning the deity Sun and the Divine Mother respectively, serve the purpose of an invocation. Or they may refer to the two Chosen Deities of the author.

[2] Or the clause may mean: From whom I have learnt the subject.

[3] Or the line may mean: For the understanding in brief by boys of the principles, etc. One edition reads *'akleśa'* for *'leśa,'* which would give the meaning: For the easy understanding by boys of the principles, etc.

[4] Many editions read *'dhīmatām'* instead of *'dhīmatā,'* in which case the adjective, meaning 'intelligent,' would refer to *boys*.]

इह खलु महर्षिणा जैमिनिना द्वादशलक्षण्यां पूर्वमीमांसायां धर्माधर्मावेवानुष्ठानोपयोगितया विचारितौ। तत्र वेदबोधितेष्टसाधनताको धर्मः; यथा यागादिः। वेदबोधितानिष्टसाधनताकोऽधर्मः; यथा कलञ्जभक्षणादिः। तयोश्च वेदः स्मृतिराचारश्च प्रमाणम्। तत्र वेदः स्वतन्त्रं प्रमाणम्, इतरौ तु वेदमूलकतया।

तत्र वेदो द्विविधः—मन्त्ररूपो ब्राह्मणरूपश्चेति। तत्र प्रयोगकालीनार्थस्मरणहेतुतया मन्त्राणामुपयोग इति वक्ष्यते। प्रयोगोऽनुष्ठानम्, तत्कालीनेत्यर्थः। विधायकं वाक्यं ब्राह्मणम्। तच्छेषश्चार्थवादः। तस्य विधेयप्राशस्त्यप्रतीतिजननद्वारा विधिवाक्यैकवाक्यतया प्रामाण्यमिति वक्ष्यते।

Here, in the Pūrva-Mīmāṁsā consisting of twelve chapters,[1] the great seer, Jaimini, has discussed only righteous and unrighteous action[2] as being capable of performance. Of these, righteous action is that which is described by the Vedas as bringing on what is desirable[3]; as, for instance, sacrifices etc. Unrighteous action is that which is described by the Vedas as bringing on what is undesirable[4]; as, for instance, eating *kalañja*[5] and so on. Regarding both, the Vedas, the Smṛtis,[6] and (approved) usage are the authority. Of these, the Vedas are independently authoritative, while the other two are so as being based on the Vedas.

Now the Vedas have two forms, as consisting of sacred texts (*mantras*) and sacred commentaries (*brāhmaṇas*). Regarding these, it will be stated later on (p. 74) that sacred texts have utility as helping[7] to recall the things[8] concerned at the time of performance. *Prayoga* in the text means performance; relating to that—this is the meaning (of '*prayoga-kālīna*'). A sacred commentary (*brāhmaṇa*) is a sentence enjoining something. And a corroborative statement (*arthavāda*) is an auxiliary to that. It will be stated later on (p. 69) that a corroborative statement is authoritative as forming a unitary passage with a sentence inculcating an injunction, by leading to the impression that the thing enjoined is praiseworthy.

[[1] The word '*lakṣaṇa*,' literally meaning a characteristic, here means a chapter.

[2] As opposed to Brahman, which is the theme of the Vedānta, dealt with by Bādarāyaṇa.

[3] That is, beneficial.

[4] That is, harmful.

[5] Meat of an animal killed with a poisoned arrow. It is the spiritual evil resulting from the eating of such meat that is meant, and not any possible physical evil. The word also means a red onion.

[6] Books composed by sages to regulate human conduct on the basis of the Vedas, which are believed to be the eternal wisdom of God, revealed only to certain gifted persons called *ṛṣis* or seers.

[7] Otherwise they would be regarded as superfluous.

[8] Viz., the sacrificial offerings, the deities to whom the sacrifice is made, and whatever else is connected with a sacrifice.]

VARIETIES OF BRĀHMAṆA SENTENCES

ब्राह्मणवाक्यं चानेकविधम्—कर्मोत्पत्तिवाक्यम्, गुणवाक्यम्, फलवाक्यम्, फलाय गुणवाक्यम्, सगुणकर्मोत्पत्तिवाक्यमित्यादिभेदात् ।

तत्र येन वाक्येन 'इदं कर्म कर्तव्यम्' इति बोध्यते तत् कर्मोत्पत्तिवाक्यम् ; यथा "अग्निहोत्रं जुहोति" इति । अत्राग्निहोत्रहोमः कर्तव्यतया विधीयत इति कर्मोत्पत्तिवाक्यमिदम् ।

विहिते कर्मणि तदङ्गतया द्रव्यदेवतादिविधायकं वाक्यं गुणवाक्यम् ; यथा "दध्ना जुहुयात्" इति । अत्र होममुद्दिश्याङ्गतया

दधि विधीयत इति गुणवाक्यमिदम्। कर्माङ्गतया विहितत्वमेव दध्यादेर्गुणत्वम्।

Sentences constituting sacred commentary are manifold, being divided into sentences originating a rite, those dealing with accessòries, those setting forth results, those inculcating the accessories for results, those originating a rite together with its accessories, and so on.

Of these, a sentence originating a rite is that by which one understands that such and such a rite is to be performed; for example, "One should[1] offer the Agnihotra" (*Tai. S.* I. v. ix. 1). Here the *homa*[2] called Agnihotra[3] is enjoined as a thing to be done; hence it is a sentence originating a rite.

A sentence that enjoins, with regard to a rite that has already been enjoined, materials, deities, etc. as its subsidiaries, is called a sentence dealing with accessories; for instance, "One should perform *homa* with curd" (*Tai. Br.* II. 1. v. 6?). Here, with reference to *homa*, curd is enjoined as its subsidiary; hence it is a sentence dealing with accessories. Curd etc. are accessories, just because they are enjoined as subsidiaries to a rite.

[[1] Though the verb in such cases may be in the present tense, it is to be interpreted as being optative.

[2] Offering oblations in the sacred fire.

[3] The lifelong offering of milk in the sacred fire, every morning and evening, by married men of the upper three castes among the Hindus.]

अत्र होमस्योद्देश्यत्वं नाम मानान्तरप्राप्तत्वे सति विधेयान्वयितया निर्देश्यत्वम्। तस्यैव मानान्तरप्राप्तस्य पुनः कथ्यमानरूपत्वमनुवाद्यत्वम्, दध्यादिगुणान्वयितया प्राधान्यञ्च। दध्यादेर्मानान्तरा-

प्राप्तत्वादत्रैव विधेयत्वम्, होमसाधनत्वाच्च होमापेक्षया गुणत्वम्, पुरुषेणानुष्ठीयमानत्वादुपादेयत्वञ्च । अत्र मानान्तरप्राप्तत्वं मानान्तरज्ञातत्वम्, अप्राप्तत्वञ्चाज्ञातत्वमिति बोध्यम् ।

उत्पन्नस्य कर्मणः फलाकांक्षायां फलसम्बन्धबोधको विधिः फलविधिः ; यथा "अग्निहोत्रं जुहुयात् स्वर्गकामः" इति । अत्र 'यः स्वर्गं कामयते स तत्साधनत्वेनाग्निहोत्रनामकं होमं भावयेत्—कुर्यात्' इति अग्निहोत्रवाक्योत्पन्नस्य कर्मणः फलसम्बन्धो बोध्यत इति फलवाक्यमिदम् ।

Here the *homa* is called a matter under reference (*uddeśya*), because it is already known from another authoritative source,[1] and is at the same time capable of being described as that with which an enjoined rite comes into relation. That, again, is called the thing restated, when, as already known from another authoritative source, it is mentioned once more. And, as having curd etc. related to it as its accessories, it is designated as the principal matter. The curd etc., not being known from any other authoritative source, are the things enjoined here itself; being means to the *homa,* they are accessories in respect of it; and being used by a person, they are things to be utilised. Here we must understand that 'being obtained from another authoritative source' in the text means 'being known from another authoritative source,' and 'not being obtained' means 'not being known.'

An injunction about results is that which, when a rite has been originated,[2] and there is an expectancy about its result, inculcates the connection of that rite with a particular result; for example, the sentence, "One who desires heaven should offer the Agnihotra." It means: One who desires heaven should, as a means to it, bring about or perform the *homa* called Agnihotra. Here we understand the connection of the rite originated by the sentence inculcating the Agnihotra, with a certain result. Hence this is a sentence setting forth results.

[[1] *Māna* or *pramāṇa* is a means of valid knowledge. Here it is another scriptural text.

[2] That is, originally enjoined by some other text.]

प्राप्तं कर्माश्रित्य फलाय गुणविधौ फलाय गुणवाक्यम्; यथा "दध्नेन्द्रियकामस्य जुहुयात्" इति। अत्राग्निहोत्रवाक्योत्पन्नं होममाश्रित्येन्द्रियफलाय दधिरूपो गुणो विधीयते—'होमाश्रितेन दध्ना इन्द्रियरूपं फलं भावयेत्' इति। होमाश्रितेन होमकारकीभूतेनेत्यर्थः। अयमेव गुणफलविधिः, गुणकामविधिरिति चोच्यते।

Where, with regard to a rite already known, an accessory is enjoined for obtaining a certain result, it is a sentence inculcating the accessories for results; for instance, "For a person desiring (vigorous) organs (the priest) should perform *homa* with curd" (*Tai. Br.* II. I. v. 5, adapted). Here, with regard to the *homa* originated by the sentence inculcating the Agnihotra, an accessory, viz., curd, is enjoined for obtaining (vigorous) organs as a result; the sentence meaning, 'One should bring about (vigorous) organs as a result by means of curd used in the *homa*. 'Used in the *homa*' means, 'forming a constituent of the *homa*.' This is also called 'an injunction inculcating results due to (particular) accessories,' and 'an injunction inculcating desired objects due to accessories.'

द्रव्यदेवतादिगुणविशिष्टकर्मविधायकं वाक्यं सगुणकर्मोत्पत्तिवाक्यम्; यथा "सोमेन यजेत" इति। अत्र सोमलताविशिष्टो यागो विधीयते। विशिष्टविधावपि विशेषणस्यार्थाद्विधिः।

क्वचित् कर्मोत्पत्तिवाक्यमेव फलसम्बन्धबोधकमपि भवति ; यथा "उद्भिदा यजेत पशुकामः" इति। अत्रोद्भिन्नामको यागो वाक्यान्तराविहित एव पशुफलाय विधीयत इत्येकमेवेदं वाक्यं फलसाधनयागविधायकम् ।

A sentence originating a rite together with its accessories is one that enjoins a rite characterised by its accessories, such as the material and deity; for example, "One should sacrifice with the *soma*[1] (juice)." Here a sacrifice, of which the *soma* creeper is a characteristic, is enjoined. Although it is an injunction regarding something[2] possessed of a certain characteristic,[3] yet the injunction is necessarily[4] with regard to the characteristic also.

Sometimes a sentence originating a rite is also indicative of its connection with a result; for instance, "One who desires cattle should sacrifice through the Udbhid" (*Tāṇ*. *Br*. XIX. vii. 2). Here a sacrifice called Udbhid, which is not enjoined by any other sentence, is simultaneously enjoined to obtain animals as a result. Hence this one and the same sentence enjoins both the result and its means, the sacrifice.

[[1] An annual creeper yielding an invigorating and slightly intoxicating juice, held sacred in ancient times ; also its juice.

[2] Viz., a sacrifice.

[3] Viz., the ingredient *soma*, which distinguishes the sacrifice.

[4] For a thing possessed of a certain characteristic cannot be used without using the characteristic, too. Hence the injunction, although purporting to lay down the former, automatically implies the latter also. Since the characteristic is not directly enjoined, there is not a split of the sentence, which would be a defect.]

THE INJUNCTION REGARDING PERFORMANCE

प्रधानविधिरेवाङ्गविधिभिरेकवाक्यतया महावाक्यतामापन्नः सन् सर्वाङ्गविशिष्टप्रधानप्रयोगविधायकत्वात् प्रयोगविधिरित्युच्यते; यथा "अग्निहोत्रं जुहुयात् स्वर्गकामः" इति। अत्र 'अग्निहोत्रहोमेन स्वर्गं भावयेत्' इत्यर्थः प्रतीयते। भावयेत्—उत्पादयेत्, कुर्यात् इति यावत्। अत्र 'कथमनेन होमेन स्वर्गं कुर्यात्' इति कथम्भावाकांक्षा जायते। यथा 'कुठारेण द्वैधीभावं कुर्यात्' इत्युक्ते भवत्याकांक्षा 'कथमनेन द्वैधीभावं कुर्यात्' इति। तत्र 'उद्यमननिपातनादिसहायेन' इति गम्यते। तद्वदत्रापि "अग्निं प्रणयति," "अग्निषु समिध आदधाति" इत्याद्यङ्गविधिविहितप्रणयनसमिदाधानायतनशोधनादिकाङ्गकलापजनितोपकारसहितेन अग्निहोत्रहोमेन स्वर्गं कुर्यात् इति प्रकरणकल्पितेन महावाक्येन स्वर्गाय साङ्गाग्निहोत्रप्रयोगो विधीयत इत्येतादृशः प्रयोगविधिः। अङ्गजातमेवेत्थम्भाव इति, इतिकर्तव्यता इति चोच्यते। अत्राग्निहोत्रहोमः प्रधानम्, प्रणयनादिकं सर्वमङ्गम्।

The injunction regarding a principal rite, forming a unitary passage with injunctions regarding subsidiary rites, becomes a comprehensive passage, and since it enjoins the performance of the principal rite comprising all its subsidiary rites, it is designated as an injunction regarding performance[1]; for instance, the sentence, "One who desires heaven should offer the Agnihotra." Here the meaning is understood to be: "One should bring about heaven through the *homa* called Agnihotra." 'Should bring about'—that is to say, 'should produce,' or 'should perform.' Here there is an expectancy as to the process: "How should one bring about heaven through this *homa*?"—just as when it is stated, "One should cut in two with an axe," there is the expectancy: "How should the

cutting in two be done with this?" Then one understands that it should be done through such means as raising the axe and letting it come down. Similarly, here also the performance of the Agnihotra together with its subsidiary rites is enjoined with a view to heaven by the following comprehensive sentence, assumed from the context: One should bring about heaven through the *homa* called Agnihotra, with the aid given by the totality of subsidiary rites such as leading the fire,[2] laying the fuel and purifying the altar, prescribed by injunctions regarding subsidiary rites such as, "One should lead the fire," and "One should add fuel to the fire." Such is the injunction regarding performance. The subsidiary rites taken together are also designated as the manner or *modus operandi*. Here the *homa* called Agnihotra is the principal rite, and leading (the fire) and the rest are all subsidiaries.

[[1] According to another classification, there are four types of injunctions, dealing respectively with origination (*utpatti*), applicaton (*viniyoga*), performance (*prayoga*) and qualification (*adhikāra*). Of these, only the third one is described here, as being necessary to explain the different unique results; the other three are left out as following from what has gone before. For example, the first type of injunction is the same as "sentences originating a rite" mentioned on p. 4. The second, which brings out the relation of principal and subsidiary between certain things, comprises the second and third types of sentences mentioned there; for in the former an accessory is allocated to a certain rite, and in the latter a rite is prescribed for a particular result. And the last type of injunction is included in "sentences setting forth results," which also mention what kind of aspirant is qualified for a particular rite.

[2] Taking a portion of the Gārhapatya fire, in which the daily Agnihotra is performed, to the pit of the Āhavanīya, the fire for special Vedic sacrifices.]

नन्विदमनुपपन्नम्, आशुतरविनाशिनां कर्मणां कालान्तरभाविस्वर्गादिफलसाधनत्वानुपपत्तेरिति चेत्, मैवम्। विहितनिषिद्धकर्मणां तत्तद्वाक्यैस्तत्तत्फलसाधनत्वेऽवगते आशुतरविनाशिनां कर्मणां कालान्तरभाविफलसाधनत्वोपपत्त्यर्थमन्तरा पुण्यपापरूपमपूर्वं कल्प्यते। ततश्च यागादेरपूर्वद्वारा स्वर्गसाधनत्वम्, न साक्षात्। तदेव फलापूर्वम्। तत्करणत्वञ्च प्राच्योदीच्याङ्गविशिष्टस्य प्रधानस्य भवति, न प्रधानमात्रस्य। प्रधानमात्रादेव फलापूर्वजनने फलस्यापि तत एव सिद्धेरङ्गानामानर्थक्यापत्तेः।

Objection: But this does not stand to reason, since rites, which perish very quickly, cannot serve as the means to heaven etc. that are to be realised at some future time.[1]

Reply: Not so; for when acts enjoined or forbidden have been known from particular texts to be the means to particular results, in order that acts which perish very quickly may be the means to results taking place at some future time, a principle called the unique result (*apūrva*), consisting of merit and demerit, is assumed in the interim. Therefore sacrifices etc. are means to heaven through the medium of the unique result, and not directly. This is what is also called the final unique result. Its instrument is the principal rite together with its prior and posterior subsidiaries, not the principal rite alone. If the latter alone produced the final unique result, the result of the rite also would accrue from that,[2] and hence the subsidiary rites would be redundant.

[[1] Because a cause is immediately antecedent to its effect.

[2] From the final unique result produced by the principal rite alone.]

ननु सर्वाङ्गविशिष्टस्य प्रधानस्यापूर्वजनकत्वमयुक्तम्, आशुतरविनाशिनः प्रधानस्याङ्गसाहित्याभावादिति चेत्, न; प्रधानकर्मणः स्वरूपेणाङ्गसाहित्याभावेऽपि उत्पत्त्यपूर्वद्वारा साहित्यसम्भवात्। प्रधानस्य सर्वाङ्गसाहित्यसिद्ध्यर्थं प्रधानकर्मपरमापूर्वयोर्मध्ये प्रधानमात्रजन्यमुत्पत्तिनामकं किञ्चिदपूर्वमस्तीत्यङ्गीकारात्। एवमङ्गानामपि परस्परसहितानामेव प्रधानोपकारकत्वात्तेषां स्वरूपेण साहित्याभावात् तत्तदुत्पत्त्यपूर्वद्वारा साहित्यं बोध्यम्। अङ्गानां प्रधानोपकारकत्वं नाम प्रधानस्य फलापूर्वजननसामर्थ्योन्मुखीकरणमेव।

Objection: But it is unreasonable to hold that the principal rite together with all its subsidiaries produces the unique result; for the principal rite, which perishes very quickly, can never combine with its subsidiaries.

Reply: No; because although the principal rite does not directly combine with its subsidiaries, the combination is possible through the initial unique result (*utpattyapūrva*). For, in order that the principal rite may combine with all its subsidiaries, it is admitted that between it and the final unique result there exists another unique result called the initial one, which is produced by the principal rite alone. Similarly, since the subsidiary rites, too, help the principal rite only in combination with one another, and since they cannot mutually combine by themselves, the combination is understood to take place through their respective initial unique results. The helping of the principal rite by the subsidiary rites consists merely in their stimulating the former's capacity to produce the final unique result.

दर्शपूर्णमासयोस्तु विशेषः—"यदाग्नेयोऽष्टाकपालोऽमावास्यायाञ्च पौर्णमास्याञ्चाच्युतो भवति" इत्याग्नेययागो विहितः, "ताभ्यामेतमग्नीषोमीयमेकादशकपालं पूर्णमासे प्रायच्छत्" इत्यग्नीषोमीययागो विहितः, "उपांशुयाजमन्तरा यजति" इति उपांशुयागः "तावब्रूतामग्नीषोमावाज्यस्यैव नावुपांशु पौर्णमास्यां यजन्" इति वाक्यात् पौर्णमास्यां विहितः। एतानि पौर्णमास्यां प्रधानानि। एषामाग्नेयाग्नीषोमीयोपांशुयागानां तत्तद्वाक्यावगतपौर्णमासीकालसम्बन्धं निमित्तीकृत्य "य एवं विद्वान् पौर्णमासीं यजते" इति विद्वद्वाक्ये पौर्णमासीपदेन एकवचनान्तेन समुदायरूपेणानुवादः। तेन वेदे यत्र यत्र पौर्णमासीशब्दः तत्र तत्राग्नेयादिसमुदायोपस्थितिः।

But in the case of the new-moon (Darṣa) and full-moon (Pūrṇamāsa) sacrifices[1] there is a difference.[2] (To explain): The sentence, "Because (the cake) relating to the Fire, baked on eight thin tiles,[3] is undecaying on the new- and the full-moon day" (*Tai*. S. II. vi. iii. 3), enjoins the sacrifice relating to the Fire. The sentence, "(Indra) offered this (cake) relating to the Fire and the Moon, baked on eleven thin tiles, to those two (deities) on the full-moon day" (*Tai*. Ṣ. II. v. ii. 3), enjoins the sacrifice to the Fire and the Moon. The sentence, "One should perform the Upāṁśu[4] sacrifice in between" (*Tai*. S. II. vi. vi. 4), enjoins the Upāṁśu sacrifice, and the sentence, "The two (deities), the Fire and the Moon, said, 'Performing the Upāṁśu sacrifice to us with ghee alone on the full-moon day,' " fixes the full-moon day for it. These (three) are the principal sacrifices in the full-moon sacrifice. On the basis of the connection of these (three) sacrifices, viz., the one to the Fire, the one to the Fire and the Moon, and the one called Upāṁśu, with a particular time, viz., the full-moon

day, as is known from the respective texts, the sentence containing the word 'knowing,' viz., "He who knowing thus performs the full-moon sacrifice" (*Tai S.* I. vi. ix. 1), restates the three sacrifices as a group by means of the term 'full-moon sacrifice,' which is in the singular number. Hence wherever the term 'full-moon sacrifice' occurs in the Vedas, the group consisting of the (three) sacrifices to the Fire and so on is understood.

[[1] They are typical sacrifices of the class called Iṣṭi-yāga.

[2] Viz., that each triad of the main sacrifices produces a unique result (p. 17).

[3] Arranged compactly together.

[4] So called because in it the priest offers oblations uttering sacred texts in a very low voice.]

ननु "यदाग्नेय" इति वाक्ये यागवाचकपदस्याश्रवणात् कथं यागविधायकत्वमिति चेत्, मैवम्। अग्निर्देवता अस्य पुरोडाशस्य इत्यर्थे विहितदेवतातद्धितान्त आग्नेयशब्दः। तस्य पुरोडाशपदसामानाधिकरण्याद्द्रव्यदेवतासम्बन्धोऽवगतः। स यागमन्तरा न सम्भवति, द्रव्यदेवतासम्बन्धस्य यागादन्यत्र क्रियायामसम्भवात् यागक्रियायामेव सम्बन्धो वाच्यः। देवतोद्देशेन द्रव्यत्यागस्य यागरूपत्वाङ्गीकारात्। अतः श्रुतद्रव्यदेवतासम्बन्धानुमितो यागो यजेतेति कल्पितेन पदेन विधीयते, अग्निदैवत्यपुरोडाशद्रव्यकामावास्यादिकालकर्तव्ययागेन इष्टं भावयेदिति। एवं यत्र द्रव्यदेवतासम्बन्धमात्रं श्रूयते, "सौर्यञ्चरुं निर्वपेत्" इत्यादौ, तत्र द्रव्यदेवतासम्बन्धानुमितो यागो विधीयत इति न कश्चिद्दोषः।

Objection: In the sentence, "Because (the cake) relating to the Fire," etc. there is no word denoting a sacrifice. So how can it enjoin a sacrifice?

Reply: Not so; the word *āgneya* (relating to the Fire) in the text has the affix denoting a prescribed deity, so as to mean that this cake has the Fire for its deity. Its connection with the material and the deity is known from its being in apposition to the word 'cake' (understood). That cannot be without a sacrifice, for the connection with the material and deity is impossible in any other act than a sacrifice. So they must be taken to relate to the act of sacrifice alone; for it is the dedication[1] of something to a deity that is held to constitute a sacrifice. Therefore the sacrifice, inferred from its expressed connection with the material and deity, is enjoined by an assumed word *yajeta* (should sacrifice) so as to mean: "One should bring about the desired object by means of a sacrifice of which the Fire is the deity and the cake is the material, and which is to be performed at a particular time such as the new-moon day. Similarly, where only the connection with some material and deity is expressed, as, for example, in the sentence, "One should set apart the porridge relating to the Sun" (*Tai. S.* II. III. ii. 3), there a sacrifice, inferred from its connection with the deity and material, is enjoined. So there is no objection.

[[1] By the sacrificer, who transfers his ownership of the article of oblation to a particular deity, saying, "This is given to the Fire (or Indra etc.) and is no longer mine." After that the priest called *adhvaryu* puts the oblation in the sacrificial fire, which is 'offering.']

ननूपांशुयागवाक्ये यजेः श्रवणेऽपि विधिप्रत्ययलिङादेरभावात् कथं विधायकत्वमिति चेत्, मैवम्। यजतीत्यस्य यजेतेति विपरिणामेन विधायकत्वसम्भवात्। एवं "व्रीहीन् प्रोक्षति," "समिधो यजति" इत्यादावपि विपरिणामो बोध्यः। केचित्तु यजतीत्यस्य पञ्चमलकारत्वाङ्गीकारात् विधायकत्वसम्भव इत्याहुः।

तथा "ऐन्द्रं दध्यमावास्यायाम्," "ऐन्द्रं पयोऽमावास्यायाम्"

इति वाक्यविहितौ सान्नाय्ययागौ, "यदाग्नेय" इति वाक्यविहिताग्नेयश्चामावास्यायां प्रधानानि।

Objection: In the sentence relating to the Upāṁśu sacrifice,[1] although the root *yaji* (to sacrifice) occurs, there is no optative suffix such as *liṅ*[2]; so how can it[3] have the force of an injunction?

Reply: Not so; it can have the injunctive force by changing *yajati* into *yajeta.*[4] Similarly, a change is understood also in sentences like, "One should sprinkle the rice grains," and "One should perform the Samidh sacrifice[5]" (*Tai S.* II. vi. i. 1). Some, however, maintain that such sentences can be injunctive, because the word *yajati* is accepted to have the force of a verbal suffix of the fifth group.[6]

Likewise, the two sacrifices with curd and milk, enjoined by the sentences, "The curd relating to Indra (should be offered) on the new-moon day" (*Tai. S.* II. v. iv. 1), and "The milk relating to Indra (should be offered) on the new-moon day," as also the sacrifice relating to the Fire, enjoined by the sentence, "Because (the cake) relating to the Fire," etc. (p. 12), are the principal sacrifices in the new-moon sacrifice.

[[1] See p. 12.

[2] The verb *yajati* being in the present tense.

[3] The sentence.

[4] This is an allowable procedure.

[5] Named after its deities, the Samidhs.

[6] Called *leṭ*. Hence no change of suffix is necessary. The first four groups of suffixes are: *laṭ* (present), *liṭ* (remote past), *luṭ* and *lṛṭ* (both future).]

एषां त्रयाणां "य एवं विद्वानमावास्यां यजते" इति वाक्ये अमावास्यामिति नाम्ना द्वितीयैकवचनान्तेन समुदायरूपेणानुवादः। तेन

वेदे यत्र दर्शशब्दोऽमावास्याशब्दो वा श्रुतस्तत्र यागसमुदायोपस्थितिः। त्रिकस्य त्रिकस्यामावास्यापौर्णमासीशब्दाभ्यां समुदायरूपेण विद्वद्वाक्येऽनुवादस्य प्रयोजनं तु “दर्शपूर्णमासाभ्यां स्वर्गकामो यजेत” इत्यादौ द्विवचनोपपत्तिः। अन्यथा षण्णामाग्नेयादियागानां बहुत्वाद्दर्शपूर्णमासैरिति बहुवचनं स्यात्। मानान्तरेण प्राप्तार्थस्य पुनःश्रवणमनुवादः।

तथा फलवदाग्नेयादिसन्निधौ आम्नातानि प्रयाजाज्यभागानूयाजादीनि षण्णां यागानामङ्गभूतानि।

These three (sacrifices) have been restated as a group in the sentence, “He who knowing thus performs the new-moon sacrifice” (*Tai. S.* I. VI. ix. 2), by means of the name ‘new-moon sacrifice,’ which is in the accusative singular. Therefore in the Vedas, where the word *‘darśa’* or *‘amāvāsyā’* (‘new-moon sacrifice’) occurs, this group of sacrifices is understood. The necessity, however, of restating each triad as a group by the terms ‘new-moon sacrifice’ and ‘full-moon sacrifice’ is to explain the dual number in sentences like, “One who desires heaven should perform the new- and the full-moon sacrifice (*darśa-pūrṇamāsābhyām*).” Otherwise, the six sacrifices relating to the Fire etc. being multiple, there should be the plural number, as *darśa-pūrṇamāsaiḥ*. Restatement (*anuvāda*) is the further mention of a thing already known from some other authoritative source.

And sacrifices such as the Prayāja, Ājyabhāga and Anūyāja, which are mentioned[1] in close proximity to the sacrifices relating to the Fire etc. that produce results of their own, are subsidiaries to the above six[2] sacrifices.

[[1] Without any reference to their results.

[2] Three of the full-moon and three of the new-moon sacrifice.]

एवं स्थिते "दर्शपूर्णमासाभ्यां स्वर्गकामो यजेत" इत्यस्यायमर्थः—दर्शपूर्णमासाभ्यां समुदायाभ्यां परस्परसहिताभ्यां स्वर्गापूर्वं कुर्यादिति। तत्र कथं कालद्वयवर्तिनोः समुदाययोः परस्परसाहित्यमित्याकांक्षायां स्वरूपेण साहित्याभावेऽपि त्रिकात्त्रिकादेकैकमपूर्वं जायते, तद्द्वारा द्वयोः समुदाययोः साहित्यमित्युच्यते। एकैकस्य त्रिकस्यापि त्रिकापूर्वजनकत्वं कथमित्याकांक्षायां प्रयाजानूयाजादिपूर्वोत्तराङ्गकलापविशिष्टस्य एकैकस्य त्रिकस्य समुदायापूर्वजनकत्वमुच्यते। एकैकत्रिकस्य सर्वाङ्गसाहित्यं स्वरूपेण न सम्भवतीति त्रिभिर्यागैस्त्रीण्युत्पत्त्यपूर्वाणि जायन्ते, तद्द्वारा सर्वाङ्गसाहित्यम्।

Such being the case, the sentence, "One who desires heaven should perform the new- and full-moon sacrifices," means: "One should bring about the unique result leading to heaven by means of the two groups (of sacrifices) called the new- and full-moon sacrifices, in combination with each other." Now, if it be asked how two groups (of sacrifices) belonging to different times can ever combine with each other, the answer is that although by themselves they cannot combine, yet each triad (of sacrifices) produces a unique result, and through these the two groups can combine. If it be asked how each triad also can produce its own unique result, the answer is that each triad, including all its prior and posterior subsidiary rites such as the Prayāja and Anūyāja, produces a unique result for the group. Since each triad cannot by itself combine with all its subsidiary rites, we must suppose that the three sacrifices produce three initial unique results, and through these they combine with all their subsidiaries.

अङ्गानामपि प्रयाजादीनां स्वरूपेण प्रधानसाहित्याभावात्

तत्तदुत्पत्त्यपूर्वद्वारा साहित्यं वाच्यम्। तथा च प्रधानजन्योत्पत्त्यपूर्वाणां प्रयाजादिजन्योत्पत्त्यपूर्वैः साहित्यं यदस्ति तदेव प्रधानानामङ्गविशिष्टत्वरूपं साङ्गत्वम्। एवञ्च पौर्णमास्यामाग्नेयादिजन्यैस्त्रिभिरपूर्वैः प्रयाजादिजन्योत्पत्त्यपूर्वसचिवैः समुदायापूर्वमेकं जन्यते, तथा दर्शेऽपि आग्नेयैन्द्रद्वयजन्यैस्त्रिभिरपूर्वैरङ्गोत्पत्त्यपूर्वसचिवैरेकं त्रिकापूर्वं जन्यते, ताभ्यां त्रिकापूर्वाभ्याम् आग्नेयाद्युत्पत्त्यपूर्वत्रितयजन्याभ्यां फलजनकीभूतं महापूर्वं फलापूर्वनामकं जन्यते, ततश्च फलमिति।

तथा च सर्वाङ्गोपकृताभ्यां दर्शपूर्णमासाभ्यामपूर्वद्वारा स्वर्गं कुर्यादिति फलापूर्वनिष्पत्तये साङ्गप्रधानकर्तव्यताबोधको विधिः प्रयोगविधिरिति सिद्धम्।

Similarly, since the subsidiary rites such as the Prayāja, too, cannot by themselves combine with the principal rites, this combination must be held to take place through their respective initial unique results. Thus, it is the combination of the initial unique results accruing from the principal rites with those accruing from the Prayāja and the rest,[1] that constitutes the completeness of the principal rites, that is to say, their inclusion of the subsidiary rites. Similarly, in the full-moon sacrifice, the three unique results accruing from the sacrifices relating to the Fire and so on, helped by the initial unique results accruing from the Prayāja etc., produce a unique result due to the group. Likewise, in the new-moon sacrifice also, the three unique results accruing from the sacrifice to the Fire and the two sacrifices[2] to Indra, helped by the initial unique results of its[3] subsidiary rites, produce a unique result due to the triad. These two unique results due to the triads, springing from the three initial unique results of the sacrifices to the Fire and so on, produce

a comprehensive unique result, called the final unique result, which is the cause of the result (of the entire sacrifice), and that leads to the result.

Thus it is established that an injunction regarding performance is one which inculcates that in order that the final unique result may be produced, the principal rite, together with its subsidiary rites, should be performed, meaning thereby that one should realise heaven by the new- and full-moon sacrifices, helped by all their subsidiaries, through the medium of the unique results produced by them.

[[1] Which are its subsidiary rites.

[2] With curd and milk respectively.

[3] Of the new-moon sacrifice.]

THREE KINDS OF INJUNCTIONS

पुनरपि विधिस्त्रिविधः—अपूर्वविधिः, नियमविधिः, परिसंख्याविधिश्चेति।

तत्र यो विधिरत्यन्ताप्राप्तमर्थं प्रापयति सोऽपूर्वविधिः; यथा दर्शपूर्णमासप्रकरणे "व्रीहीन् प्रोक्षति" इति। एतद्विध्यभावे दर्शपूर्णमासीयव्रीहिषु प्रोक्षणं कथमपि न प्राप्नोति। एतद्विधिसत्त्वे तु तत्सम्बन्धिव्रीहिषु प्रोक्षणं प्राप्नोत्येव इति अत्यन्ताप्राप्तप्रोक्षणप्रापकत्वादयमपूर्वविधिः।

Injunctions are again threefold, viz., original injunction, restrictive injunction and exclusive injunction.

Of these, an original injunction is that which inculcates about something utterly unknown; for example, in connection with the new- and full-moon sacrifices, the sentence, "One should sprinkle the rice grains." In the absence of this injunction, the sprinkling with regard to the rice grains used in the new- and full-moon sacrifices would never be known. But with this injunction, sprinkling with regard to the rice grains in question is compulsory. Hence this is an original injunction, inasmuch as it inculcates about sprinkling, which was utterly unknown.

यश्च पक्षे प्राप्तमर्थं नियमयति स नियमविधिः ; यथा तत्रव "व्रीहीनवहन्ति" इति । एतद्विध्यभावे दार्शपौर्णमासिकेषु व्रीहिषूत्पत्तिवाक्यावगतपुरोडाशोपयोगितण्डुलनिष्पत्त्यनुकूलवैतुष्यकार्याय अवहननवत् कदाचिन्नखविदलनमपि प्राप्नुयात् इति तस्मिन् पक्षेऽवहननस्य प्राप्तेरभावात् कार्यान्यथोपपत्तेरवहननस्य पाक्षिको प्राप्तिः स्यात् । सति त्वस्मिन् विधौ अवहननेनैव वैतुष्यं कार्यमिति नियमे सति विदलनं सर्वात्मना निवर्तत इति नियमविधिरयम् ।

A restrictive injunction is that which restricts something that is known only as a possible alternative; for example, in the same context as above, the sentence, "One should thresh the rice grains." In the absence of this injunction, with regard to the rice grains used in the new- and full-moon sacrifices, for the act of husking that is conducive to the emergence of rice meant for the cake—about which we know from the originative sentence[1] relating thereto—sometimes splitting with finger-nails may, like threshing, be also thought of. In that case, threshing not being resorted to, and it still being possible to produce the effect otherwise, the threshing becomes an optional means. But with this injunction, it being fixed that the husking shall be done by threshing only, splitting (with nails) is absolutely eliminated. Hence this is a restrictive injunction.

[[1] The sentence, "Because (the cake) relating to the Fire," etc. (p. 12).]

न च वैतुष्यस्य नखविदलनेनापि सम्भवात् अवहननियमो व्यर्थः, प्रयोजनाभावादिति वाच्यम्। अवघातेनैव वैतुष्यकरणे किञ्चिददृष्टं जन्यत इति नियमाददृष्टाङ्गीकारात्, नियमेन दृष्टकार्यालाभेऽप्यदृष्टस्योत्पत्तेः। तच्चापूर्वं यागोत्पत्त्यपूर्वद्वारा फलापूर्वे उपयुज्यते। तेन नियमापूर्वाभावे फलापूर्वमेव नोत्पद्यते इति कल्पनान्नियमापूर्वस्य न वैयर्थ्यम्। एवं व्रीहिसोमादिद्रव्यनियमविधिषु बोध्यम्।

It cannot be urged that as the husking can be done by splitting with nails also, the restriction about threshing is futile, since there is no need for it; for a unique result due to the restriction is admitted, viz., that some unique result is produced only if the husking is done by threshing, and although no visible effect is obtained by the restriction, an invisible one is produced. And that unique result is utilised to produce, through the initial unique result of the sacrifice, its final unique result. So, it being presumed that in the absence of the unique result due to the restriction the final unique result itself would not be produced, the unique result due to the restriction is not futile. The same principle should be understood to apply to restrictions regarding materials such as rice and the *soma* creeper.

द्वयोः समुच्चित्य प्राप्तावितरनिवृत्तिफलको विधिः परिसंख्याविधिः; यथा चयनप्रकरणे “इमामगृभ्णन् रशनामृतस्येत्यश्वाभिधानीमादत्ते” इत्यश्वरशनाग्रहणाङ्गत्वेन मन्त्रविधिः। एतद्विध्यभावे हि रशनाग्रहणप्रकाशको मन्त्रो रशनाऽऽदानप्रकाशनसामर्थ्यरूपात् लिङ्गात् अश्वरशनाऽऽदाने इव गर्दभरशनाऽऽदानेऽपि नियमेन प्राप्नुयात्। सत्यस्मिन् विधौ अनेन मन्त्रेण अश्वरशनामेवाददीत, न तु गर्दभरशनाम्, सा तु तूष्णीमेव ग्राह्येति गर्दभ-

रशनायां मन्त्रनिवृत्तिर्भवतीति द्वयोः समुच्चित्य प्राप्तावितरनिवृत्तिफलकत्वादयं परिसंख्याविधिः। एवं "पञ्च पञ्चनखा भक्ष्याः" इत्यादावपि बोध्यम्।

When something may be taken to refer to both of two alternatives simultaneously, the injunction that precludes one of them is called an exclusive injunction; for example, under the topic of brick-laying,[1] the sentence, "One should catch hold of the rein of the horse saying, 'They seized this rein of (the horse, which is the means to) the sacrifice' " (*Tai*. S. V. I. ii. I), is an injunction regarding the sacred text as a subsidiary to seizing the rein of the horse. For in the absence of this injunction, the sacred text expressing the seizing of the rein would, on account of the indication, viz., the power to express the seizing of the rein, apply invariably to seizing the rein of the donkey as well as that of the horse. With this injunction, however, one should seize the rein of the horse, uttering this sacred text, and not that of the donkey, which is to be seized just silently. Thus the sacred text is dissociated from the seizing of the rein of the donkey. And since the injunction leads to the exclusion of one of the two alternatives, to both of which something may be taken to refer simultaneously, it is an exclusive injunction. The same principle should be understood to apply also to sentences like, "Only five[2] animals with five nails (on each paw) may be eaten" (*Rām*. IV. xvii. 39).

[[1] For constructing a pit for the fire. To carry earth for making bricks for this, both a horse and a donkey are prescribed.

[2] Viz., two varieties of porcupines, the iguana, the rabbit and the tortoise. Other five-nailed animals are to be shunned.]

SIX TESTS OF A SUBSIDIARY

पूर्वं दर्शपूर्णमासाङ्गत्वं प्रयाजादीनामुक्तम्। तत्राङ्गत्वबोधकप्रमाणानि श्रुति-लिङ्ग-वाक्य-प्रकरण-स्थान-समाख्याभेदेन षट्।

तत्र "दध्ना जुहुयात्" इत्यत्राग्निहोत्रवाक्यप्राप्तं होमं जुहुयादित्यनेनोद्दिश्य तत्करणत्वेन तृतीयाश्रुत्या दधि विधीयत इति श्रुत्या दध्नोऽङ्गत्वम्।

In the preceding portion, the Prayāja and other sacrifices have been stated to be subsidiaries to the new- and full-moon sacrifices. Now the proofs indicative of the subsidiary relation are six, viz., direct assertion (*śruti*), indication (*liṅga*), syntactical connection (*vākya*), context (*prakaraṇa*), position (*sthāna*) and designation (*samākhyā*).

Of these, in the sentence, "One should sacrifice with curd" (*Tai. Br.* II. I. v. 6?), after *homa,* which is known from the sentence inculcating the Agnihotra, is referred to by the verb 'should sacrifice,' curd is enjoined as a means to that by direct assertion, viz., the instrumental case-ending. So the curd is proved to be a subsidiary on account of the direct assertion.

लिङ्गं नाम सामर्थ्यम्। तच्च द्विविधम्—अर्थगतं शब्दगतञ्चेति। आद्यं यथा "स्रुवेणावद्यति" इत्यवदानसामान्यशेषत्वावगमेऽपि स्रुवस्य सामर्थ्यरूपात् लिङ्गात् आज्यसान्नाय्यादिद्रवद्रव्यावदानविशेषाङ्गत्वम्; स्रुवेण पुरोडाशाद्यवदानस्य कर्तुमशक्यत्वात्। शब्दगतं तु लिङ्गमर्थप्रकाशनसामर्थ्यम्; यथा "अग्नये जुष्टं निर्वपामि" इति मन्त्रस्य निर्वापप्रकाशनसामर्थ्यरूपात् लिङ्गात् निर्वापाङ्गत्वम्। यस्य मन्त्रस्य यत्प्रकाशनसामर्थ्यं तस्य तदङ्गत्वम्।

Indication is capability. It is twofold, viz., that which is pertaining to sense, and that which is verbal. An example of the first is this: In the sentence, "One should divide with the ladle," although the ladle may be taken to be an accessory to dividing in general, yet, from the indication, that is, the capability of the ladle, we understand that it is a subsidiary to a special kind of dividing, viz., that of liquid substances only like ghee, curd or milk; for it is impossible to divide a cake etc. with a ladle. Verbal indication, however, is the power of denoting something. For instance, the sacred text, "I set apart (the rice grains) in an agreeable form for the Fire" (*Tai*. S. I. 1. iv. 2), is a subsidiary to the act of offering,[1] owing to the indication, viz., its power of denoting offering. A sacred text that expresses a particular meaning is a subsidiary to that.

[[1] And not to the principal sacrifice, to which the offering is a subsidiary.]

पदान्तरसमभिव्याहारो वाक्यम्। यथा "इषे त्वेति छिनत्ति" इत्यत्र छेदनाङ्गत्वेन "इषे त्वा" इति मन्त्रो वाक्येन विधीयते। यद्वा "अग्नये जुष्टम्" इत्यत्रैव 'अग्नये,' 'जुष्टम्' इत्यादिपदानां 'निर्वपामी'त्यनेनैकवाक्यतापन्नत्वान्निर्वापाङ्गत्वम्।

Syntactical connection is the joint utterance with some other word. For example, in the sentence, "He should cut (the *palāśa* branch[1]), saying, 'For food (I cut thee),' " the sacred text 'For food' is enjoined as a subsidiary to the act of cutting by syntactical connection. Or, in the very sentence (quoted above), "I set apart (the rice grains) in an agreeable form for the Fire" (*Tai*. S. I. 1. iv. 2), the words 'in an agreeable form' and 'to the Fire' are a subsidiary to the act of separating, since they form a unitary passage with the words 'I offer.'

[[1] For removing the calf from the cow before milking her. The milk is referred to as 'food.']

प्रकरणं नाम परस्पराकांक्षा। यथा “दर्शपूर्णमासाभ्यां स्वर्गकामो यजेत” इत्यत्र दर्शपूर्णमासाभ्यां स्वर्गापूर्वं कुर्यादित्युक्ते भवत्याकांक्षा—कथमाभ्यां स्वर्गापूर्वं कर्तव्यमिति। तथा फलवदाग्नेयादिसन्निधौ “समिधो यजति,” “तनूनपातं यजति,” “आज्यभागौ यजति” इत्यादिभिः प्रयाजादयः फलरहिताः श्रुताः, तेषां स्ववाक्येषु फलाश्रवणात् भवति प्रयोजनाकांक्षा—किमेतेषां प्रयोजनमिति। ततश्च प्रयाजादीनां प्रयोजनाकांक्षायां दर्शपूर्णमासयोश्च कथम्भावाकांक्षायां परस्पराकांक्षालक्षणेन प्रकरणेन प्रयाजादीनां सर्वेषां दर्शपूर्णमासाङ्गत्वं निश्चीयते।

Context is mutual expectancy. For example, in the sentence, “One who desires heaven should perform the new- and full-moon sacrifices,” when it is stated that one should bring about the unique result leading to heaven by means of the new- and full-moon sacrifices, there is the expectancy: how is that unique result to be brought about by these two (sacrifices)? Similarly, in proximity to sacrifices relating to the Fire and so on, which produce definite results, are mentioned the Prayāja and other sacrifices without any results, in sentences like: “One should perform the Samidh sacrifice” (*Tai. S.* II. VI. i. I), “One should perform the Tanunapāt sacrifice”[1] (*Ibid.*) and “One should sacrifice with the two oblations of ghee (to the Fire and the Moon)” (*Ibid.*). Since no results are mentioned for them in their respective sentences, there is the expectancy: what is the utility of these? Hence, there being an expectancy with regard to the utility of the Prayāja and the other sacrifices, and (a similar) expectancy with regard to the *modus operandi* of the new- and full-moon sacrifices, it is decided by reason of the context, which is mutual expectancy, that the Prayāja and all the other sacrifices are subsidiaries to the new- and full-moon sacrifices.

[[1] Named, like the previous one, after its deity.]

स्थानं नाम सन्निधिः। यथा सान्नाय्यपात्रसन्निधौ “शुन्धध्वम्” इति मन्त्रस्य पाठात् सन्निधानात् सान्नाय्यपात्रप्रोक्षणाङ्गत्वम्।

समाख्या संज्ञा। यथा अध्वर्युकाण्डप्रतिपादिते कर्मजाते आध्वर्यवसमाख्यावशात् अध्वर्योः कर्तृत्वेनाङ्गत्वम्। तथा “ऐन्द्राग्नमेकादशकपालं निर्वपेत् प्रजाकामः” इत्यादिषु काम्येष्टिसमाख्यातेषु ऐन्द्राग्नादियागेषु काम्येष्टियाज्यानुवाक्याकाण्डसमाख्यावशात् “उभा वामिन्द्राग्नी” इत्यादिनां याज्यानुवाक्यात्वेन विनियोगः। विनियोगो नाम अङ्गत्वेनान्वयः।

Position is proximity. For example, inasmuch as in proximity to the (mention of the) vessels of curd and milk, there occurs the sacred text, 'Be purified' (*Tai. S.* I. i. 3 etc.), this text is taken on account of the proximity to be a subsidiary to the act of sprinkling the vessels of curd and milk.

Designation is name. For instance, with regard to the body of rites described in the section relating to the priest called *adhvaryu*,[1] we understand from their designation, 'relating to the *adhvaryu*,' that the *adhvaryu* is a subsidiary to them as their agent. Similarly, in sacrifices such as that relating to Indra and Fire, (enjoined) in sentences like, "One who desires progeny should offer (a cake) relating to Indra and Fire, baked on eleven thin tiles" (*Tai. S.* II. II. i. 1; *Mai. S.* II. i. 1), which sacrifices have the designation of Kāmyeṣṭi, the sacred texts like, "O Indra and Fire, (to invoke) you both" etc. (*Ṛ.-V.* VI. lx. 13; *Vāj. S.* III. 13; *Tai. S.* I. 1. xiv. 1; etc.), are to be applied as *yājyā* and *anuvākyā* texts, because of (their occurring in a section bearing) the designation, 'section of *yājyā* and *anuvākyā* hymns of the Kāmyeṣṭi sacrifice.' Application means 'being connected as a subsidiary.'

[[1] Who actually offers the oblations and does the cognate functions, including preparation of the articles of offering.]

श्रुत्यादीनामेकत्र समावेशे पूर्वपूर्वस्य प्राबल्यम्, उत्तरोत्तरस्य दौर्बल्यम् ।

यथा "कदाचन स्तरीरसीत्यैन्द्र्या गार्हपत्यमुपतिष्ठते" इत्यग्निहोत्रप्रकरणे श्रूयते । तत्र मन्त्रस्य इन्द्रप्रकाशनसामर्थ्यरूपात् लिङ्गात् इन्द्रोपस्थानाङ्गत्वे प्राप्ते, ऐन्द्र्येति तृतीयाश्रुत्या गार्हपत्यमिति द्वितीयाश्रुत्या च गार्हपत्योपस्थानाङ्गत्वेन विधानात् लैङ्गिक इन्द्रोपस्थाने विनियोगो बाध्यते। श्रुतिर्हि स्वतो विनियोजिका। लिङ्गं त्विन्द्रप्रकाशनसामर्थ्यमालोच्य 'ऐन्द्र्येन्द्रमुपतिष्ठते,' इति श्रुतिकल्पनाद्वारा विनियोजकमिति वाच्यम् । तच्चात्र न सम्भवति । यत्र श्रुतिविनियोगो नास्ति "अग्नये जुष्टं निर्वपामि" इत्यादौ, तत्र मन्त्रस्य निर्वापप्रकाशनसामर्थ्यमालोच्य 'अनेन मन्त्रेण निर्वापं कुर्यात्' इति श्रुतिकल्पनाद्वारा लिङ्गं विनियोजकं भवत्येव, श्रुतिकल्पनाप्रतिबन्धकाभावात् ।

When direct assertion and the rest[1] refer to the same thing simultaneously,[2] each preceding item is stronger and each succeeding item weaker.[3]

For example, we find under the topic of the Aghihotra the sentence, "They should worship the Gārhapatya[4] fire with the sacred text relating to Indra: 'Thou dost never injure us' (etc.)." Here, from the indication of the sacred text, which is its power of denoting the deity Indra, the sentence is apparently a subsidiary to the worship of Indra. But because of the direct assertions, viz., the instrumental case-ending in the phrase 'with the sacred text relating to Indra' and the accusative case-ending in the phrase, 'the Gārhapatya fire,' the sentence is enjoined as a subsidiary to the worship of the Gārhapatya fire, and hence its application to the worship of Indra, on account of the indication, is set aside. For direct assertion is directive by itself, whereas indication must be held to be so by assuming a direct assertion, viz., "They worship Indra with the sacred text relating to him," in consideration of the fact that the indication has the power of denoting the deity Indra; but that is not possible here. Where there is no direction due to direct assertion, as in a sentence like, "I set apart (the rice grains) in an agreeable form for the Fire" (*Tai. S.* I. I. iv. 2), there, considering the power of the sacred text to denote offering, a direct assertion is assumed, viz., "One should make an offering with this sacred text," and thus indication is certainly directive, for there is nothing to obstruct the assumption of a direct assertion.

[[1] The remaining five items enumerated on p. 23.

[2] And in competition with one another.

[3] Compare *Pū. Mī. Sū.* III. iii. 14, which says that when these six items relate to the same thing, each succeeding item is weaker, because it conveys its meaning less directly, that is, by invoking the aid of the preceding ones.

[4] Lit., relating to the master of the house. This is the fire in which the daily Agnihotra was performed by men of the upper three castes.]

तथा "स्योनन्ते सदनं कृणोमि···तस्मिन् सीद" इत्यत्र तस्मिन्निति तच्छब्दस्य पूर्ववाक्यार्थसापेक्षतया एकवाक्यत्वभानात् वाक्यप्रमाणेन द्वयोरेकमन्त्रत्वं भाति, लिङ्गेन तु भिन्नमन्त्रत्वं भाति; आद्यस्य सदनप्रकाशनसामर्थ्यात्, "तस्मिन् सीद" इत्यस्य सादन-

प्रकाशकत्वात्। तत्र वाक्यापेक्षया लिङ्गस्य प्राबल्यात् वाक्यं बाधित्वा लिङ्गेन "स्योनं ते" इत्यस्य सदनाङ्गत्वम्, "तस्मिन् सीद" इत्यस्य सादनाङ्गत्वमिति निर्णयः।

Similarly, in the passage, "(O cake), I am making a comfortable abode for thee. . . .; live in it"[1] (*Tai. Br.* III. VII. V. 2-3, adapted), since the word 'it,' in the phrase 'in it,' depends on the sense of the preceding sentence, the two sentences seem to be a unitary passage, and hence from the test of syntactical connection the two appear to be a single sacred text, whereas from the test of indication they appear to be two different texts; for the former has the power of denoting an abode, while the words, 'Live in it,' denote accommodating. Here the decision is that since indication is stronger than syntactical connection, it supplants the latter, so that the sentence, "I am making a comfortable abode" etc., is a subsidiary to making the abode, and the sentence, "Live in it," is a subsidiary to accommodating.[2]

[[1] Putting the baked cake in a particular vessel before use as oblation is referred to as accommodating it, and smearing the inside of the vessel with ghee before that, as making an abode.

[2] That is to say, only the first sentence is to be uttered while making the abode for the cake, and the second sentence while accommodating it there.]

"स्योनं ते" इत्यस्य "तस्मिन् सीद" इत्यनेनैकवाक्यत्वबलात् यथाकथञ्चित् सादनसामर्थ्यरूपं लिङ्गं कल्पयित्वा 'अनेन विशिष्टमन्त्रेण सादनं कुर्यात्' इति श्रुतिः कल्पनीया। सदनप्रकाशनरूपप्रत्यक्षलिङ्गेन कल्पितया 'स्योनं ते इत्यनेन सदनं कुर्यात्' इति श्रुत्या "स्योनं ते" इत्यस्य शीघ्रं सदने विनियोगे सति तेनैव मन्त्रस्य नैराकांक्ष्यात् वाक्यप्रमाणात् लिङ्गं कल्पयित्वा

श्रुतिकल्पना प्रतिबध्यते, विलम्बितत्वादिति लिङ्गेन वाक्यस्य बाधः ।

एवं वाक्येन प्रकरणस्य, प्रकरणात् क्रमस्य, क्रमात्समाख्याया बाधो वेदितव्यः । तथा श्रुत्या वाक्यादेरपि बाधः । तदेवमङ्गताबोधकप्रमाणानि श्रुत्यादीनि निरूपितानि ।

The reason why syntactical connection is supplanted by indication is this: If the sentence, "I am making a comfortable abode," etc. be taken to form a unitary passage with the sentence, "Live in it," then on the strength of that an indication, viz., its power to denote accommodating, would somehow have to be assumed, and through that a direct assertion, viz., "One should do the accommodating by means of this conjoint[1] sacred text." Now, wheh the direct assertion, "One should make the abode by uttering the sacred text, 'I am making a comfortable abode,'" etc., assumed by the manifest[2] indication that conveys the making of an abode, quickly appropriates the sentence, "I am making a comfortable abode," etc. to making the abode, that sacred text leaves no expectancy just because of that appropriation, and hence the assumption of an indication based on syntactical connection, and, through that, of a direct assertion, is obstructed, because it is delayed.[3]

Similarly one must understand that context is supplanted by syntactical connection, position by context, and designation by position. Likewise syntactical connection and the rest are supplanted by direct assertion. Thus the (six) tests signifying subsidiariness, viz., direct assertion and so forth, have been ascertained.

[[1] That is, by uttering the two sentences together

[2] Arising from verbal comprehension as soon as the sentence is heard.

[3] In the former case, only one thing has to be assumed from the observed indication, viz., direct assertion, but in the latter case, two things have to be assumed one after the other from the apparent syntactical connection, viz., first indication, and then direct assertion. Hence the latter, being a slower process, is superseded.]

WHAT IS A SUBSIDIARY?

तच्चाङ्गत्वं शेषत्वम्, पारार्थ्यमिति यावत्। परोद्देशेन प्रवृत्तकृतिव्याप्यत्वं पारार्थ्यम्। प्रयाजादीनां दर्शपूर्णमासोद्देशेन प्रवृत्तपुरुषकृतिव्याप्यत्वात् लक्षणसङ्गतिः। दर्शादेः प्रयाजाद्युद्देशेन प्रवृत्तकृतिविषयत्वाभावान्नातिव्याप्तिः। केवलप्रयाजादीनुद्दिश्य कस्यचिदपि पुरुषस्याप्रवृत्तेः।

तान्यङ्गानि द्विविधानि—सन्निपत्योपकारकाणि, आरादुपकारकाणि चेति।

That subsidiariness means, being an accessory; that is to say, subservience to something else—which means, being the object[1] of effort on the part of a person who is engaged in realising something else. Since the Prayāja and other sacrifices are objects of the effort of a person engaged in the performance of the new- and full-moon sacrifices, the definition is applicable; while the new-moon sacrifice etc. not being objects of the effort of a person engaged in the performance of the Prayāja etc., the definition does not wrongly apply there, since nobody undertakes to perform the Prayāja etc. for their own sake.

Those subsidiaries are twofold, viz., those that are componently (*sannipatya*) helpful (*upakāraka*) and those that are directly (*ārāt*) so.

[[1] That is, something which a person does to bring about a certain end.]

यान्यङ्गानि साक्षात्परम्परया वा प्रधानयागशरीरं निष्पाद्य तद्द्वारा तदुत्पत्त्यपूर्वोपयोगीनि तानि सन्निपत्योपकारकाणि ; यथा व्रीह्यादिद्रव्याणि तत्संयुक्तावहननप्रोक्षणादीनि, अग्न्यादिदेवतातत्संयुक्तयाज्यानुवाक्यानुवचनादीनि च । अत्र प्रोक्षणादेर्व्रीहिगतातिशयद्वारा, अवहननादेस्तुषविमोकादिरूपदृष्टद्वारा, व्रीह्यादीनां पिष्टद्वारा पुरोडाशनिष्पादकत्वम् , तद्द्वारा यागशरीरतदुत्पत्त्यपूर्वहेतुत्वञ्च । याज्यानुवाक्यादेर्देवतासंस्कारद्वारा, देवतायाश्च साक्षाद्यागशरीरनिर्वर्तकत्वम्, तद्द्वारा तदुत्पत्त्यपूर्वोपयोगित्वञ्च; यागस्य देवतोद्देशेन द्रव्यत्यागरूपत्वात्, द्रव्यदेवते हि यागस्वरूपमिति सिद्धान्ताच्च । एतान्येव सामवायिकानीत्युच्यन्ते ।

Subsidiaries componently helpful are those that directly or indirectly constitute the body of the principal sacrifice and thereby contribute to the initial unique result springing from that sacrifice; for instance, materials such as rice, and threshing, sprinkling, etc. relating to them; deities like the Fire, and acts like recitation from memory of sacrificial (*yājyā*) and preliminary (*anuvākyā*) hymns relating to them. Here rice etc., being converted into dough, produce cakes, and through them generate the body of the sacrifice and the initial unique result arising from it; sprinkling etc. do the same thing by imparting a transcendental quality[1] to the rice, and threshing etc. by visible results, such as removal of the husk. The sacrificial and preliminary hymns etc. generate the body of the sacrifice by imparting some purification to the deities and thereby contribute to the initial unique result accruing from the sacrifice, while the deities do so directly. For a sacrifice is but the dedication of materials to some deity, and it is an accepted principle that materials and deities alone constitute a sacrifice. It is these[2] that are (also) called inherent constituents.

[[1] The unique result.

[2] Subsidiaries componently helpful.]

आत्मसमवेतापूर्वजनकान्यारादुपकारकाणि ; यथा प्रयाजाज्यभागानूयाजादीनि। एतानि द्रव्यगतं देवतागतं वा संस्कारं न जनयन्ति, किन्त्वात्मगतमदृष्टं जनयन्ति इत्यारादुपकारकाणि।

तत्र सामान्यतः कर्म द्विविधम्—अर्थकर्म गुणकर्म चेति। तत्रात्मगतापूर्वजनकं कर्म अर्थकर्म; यथा अग्निहोत्रदर्शपूर्णमासप्रयाजादिकम्।

Subsidiaries directly helpful are those that generate unique results inhering in the soul[1]; for instance, sacrifices like the Prayāja, Ājyabhāga and Anūyāja. These do not cause any purification either in the materials or in the deities, but produce unique results in the soul. Hence they are called directly helpful.

Now, rites are generally twofold, viz., principal (*artha-karman*) and subsidiary (*guṇa-karman*).[2]

Of these, principal rites are those that produce unique results in the soul; for example, the Agnihotra, the new- and full-moon sacrifices, the Prayāja, etc.

[[1] That is, which generate righteousness or unrighteousness in the mind of the sacrificer. This definition differs entirely from that given in the *Artha-Saṁgraha* and the *Mīmāṁsā-Nyāya-Prakāśa* (*Āpadevī*), where these are defined as rites that contribute to the final unique result of the principal sacrifice.

[2] These correspond respectively to the directly and componently helpful rites, described above.]

TWO MAIN DIVISIONS OF SUBSIDIARY RITES

गुणकर्म संस्कारजनकम्। तच्च द्विविधम्—उपयुक्तसंस्कारकम्, उपयोक्ष्यमाणसंस्कारकञ्चेति।

तत्र उपयुक्तसंस्कारकं प्रतिपत्तिकर्म। उपयुक्तस्य आकीर्णकरस्य द्रव्यस्य विहितदेशे प्रक्षेपः प्रतिपत्तिरिति लक्षणात्। यथा इडाभक्षण-कृष्णविषाणाप्रासन-चतुरवत्तहोमादिकम्।

Subsidiary rites are those that cause purification. They, too, are twofold, viz., those that purify what has been used, and those that purify what is to be used.

Of these, the former are called rites of disposal (*pratipatti-karman*), for disposal is defined to be the removal to an appointed place of a material that has been used and acts as an impediment; for example, eating the remnant of the cake, throwing the black antelope's horn, the *homa* of quadruple oblation, etc.

नन्विडाभक्षणस्य प्रधानयागोपयुक्ताकीर्णकरपुरोडाशद्रव्यप्रक्षेपात्मकत्वात् प्रतिपत्तित्वं युक्तम्, होमस्य तु यागोपयुक्तद्रव्यसंस्कारकत्वाभावात् कथं प्रतिपत्तित्वम्, होमस्य यागसमानकालीनत्वेन होमसंस्कार्यस्य चतुरवत्तादेरुपयुक्तत्वाभावादिति चेत्। अत्राहुः—उपयुक्तसंस्कारमात्रं प्रतिपत्तिः, न तु प्रधानयागोपयुक्तत्वम्। तथा सति पशोर्विशसनानन्तरं वपाहृदयाद्युद्धरणकालकर्तव्यलोहितशकृन्निरसनस्य प्रतिपत्तित्वाभावप्रसङ्गात्, यागोपयुक्तद्रव्यप्रक्षेपरूपत्वाभावात्। तथा कृष्णविषाणाप्रासनस्यापि प्रतिपत्तित्वं न स्यात्, यागाङ्गभूतकण्डूयनोपयुक्तत्वेऽपि यागोपयुक्तत्वाभावात्। अतो यत्र क्वचनोपयोगमात्रं विवक्षितम्। यत्र क्वचिदुपयोगस्त्वत्राप्यस्ति, वपाहृदयाद्युद्धरणेनोपयुक्तस्य पशोः सम्बन्धिनः शकृल्लोहितस्य आकीर्णकरस्य प्रतिपत्त्यपेक्षत्वात्। एवं यथाकथञ्चिदुपयोगो होमस्थलेऽप्यस्ति।

It may be objected: Eating the remnant of the cake may well come under disposal, inasmuch as it consists in the removal of a material, viz., the cake, that has been used in the principal sacrifice and acts as an impediment. But how can *homa* (offering in the fire) be classed as disposal, since it does not purify something that has been used in a sacrifice? For *homa* taking place at the same time as the sacrifice, the quadruple oblation etc. that are to be purified by the *homa* cannot be described as having been used.

To this the reply is: Disposal is purification of just what has been used, not of what has been used in the principal sacrifice. Were it so, then, after the killing of the animal, the removal of blood and excreta, which has to be done at the time when the omentum, heart, etc. are taken out, would not be counted as disposal, for it is not the removal of something used in a sacrifice. Similarly, the throwing of the black antelope's horn also would not be regarded as disposal, because, although the horn has been used in scratching, which is a subsidiary to the sacrifice, it has not been used in the sacrifice itself. Therefore, simply the use somewhere is meant, and this sort of use occurs even in the case cited, for the excreta and blood relating to the animal that has been used by taking out its omentum, heart, etc., are impediments that require disposal. Likewise, some sort of use takes place even in the case of the *homa*.

तथाहि प्रतिपत्तिस्त्रिधा—प्रधानोत्तरकाला, प्रधानसमकाला, प्रधानपूर्वकाला चेति। तत्राद्या इडाभक्षणादिका। द्वितीया होमादिका। तथाहि—दर्शपूर्णमासप्रकरणे श्रूयते, "सकृदुपस्तृणाति," "द्विर्हविषोऽवद्यति," "सकृदभिघारयति," "चतुर-

वत्तं जुहोति" इति। तत्र चतुरवत्तवाक्ये होमानुवादेन चतुरवत्तद्रव्यं तत्साधनत्वेन न विधीयते, होमस्याप्राप्तत्वेनानुवादासम्भवात्।

For disposal is threefold, viz., that subsequent to the principal sacrifice, that concurrent with it, and that antecedent to it. Of these, the first is illustrated by such acts as the eating of the remnant of the cake; the second, by *homa* etc. To explain: In the section on the new- and full-moon sacrifices it is stated, "One should smear (the *homa* vessel) with ghee once, cut a slice off the oblation twice and pour ghee on it once—(thus) offer the quadruple oblation." Here, in the sentence inculcating the quadruple oblation, the material of the quadruple oblation is not enjoined as a restatement of *homa* as being its accessory, since the *homa*, not being already known, cannot be restated.

नच "यदाग्नेय"-वाक्याद्धोमप्राप्तिः, तद्वाक्यस्य यागविधायकत्वेन होमविधायकत्वाभावात्। नच यागहोमयोरभेद इति वाच्यम्। देवतोद्देशेन द्रव्यत्यागस्य यागशब्दार्थत्वात्, प्रक्षेपविशिष्टस्य यागस्य होमशब्दार्थत्वात्। तत्राग्नेयचोदनया यागस्य प्राप्तत्वेऽपि प्रक्षेपस्य शक्त्याऽप्राप्तत्वेनानुवादासम्भवात्। किन्तूपस्तरणद्विरवदानाभिघारणवाक्यैः प्राप्तं चतुरवत्तमुद्दिश्य तत्संस्कारत्वेन प्रक्षेपो जुहोतीत्यनेन विधीयते। स च संस्कारः प्रतिपत्तिरूप एव। "अग्नये जुष्टमभिघारयामि" इत्यादिनिर्देशैर्यागाङ्गभूताग्न्यादिदेवतार्थतया यथाकथञ्चिदुपयुक्तस्य पुरोडाशस्य प्रतिपत्त्यपेक्षतया तदवयवद्व्यवदानकर्मकप्रक्षेपस्य प्रतिपत्तिकर्मत्वौचित्यात्।

It cannot be urged that the *homa* is already known from the sentence, "Because (the cake) relating to the Fire," etc. (*Tai*. *S*. II. VI. iii. 3), for that sentence enjoining a sacrifice (*yāga*), it cannot enjoin *homa*. Nor can it be urged that a sacrifice and *homa* are identical, for the word 'sacrifice' means the dedication of something to a deity, while the word '*homa*' means a sacrifice attended with offering (in the fire). Such being the case, although a sacrifice is known from the injunction conveyed by the sentence, "Because (the cake) relating to the Fire," offering is not known from the denotative power of the word, and hence its restatement is out of the question. But with reference to the quadruple oblation, conveyed by the sentence inculcating smearing with ghee, cutting off a slice twice and pouring ghee, offering is enjoined as a purification of it by the verb 'should offer.' And that purification is indeed a form of disposal. Because the cake, somehow utilised for the purpose of a deity like the Fire, which is a subsidiary to the sacrifice on account of directions like, "I am pouring ghee (on thee, O cake) who art dear to the Fire," requires disposal, therefore the act of offering concerning a part of the cake sliced off twice should be treated as disposal.

स च संस्कारः प्रधानसमकालः। होमो हि "वषट्कृते जुहोति" इति विधानात् वषट्कारोत्तरक्षणे अध्वर्युणा कर्तव्यः। यागोऽपि तस्मिन्नेव क्षणे यागस्य स्मरणार्थेन वषट्कारेण स्मारितः सन् यजमानेनानुष्ठेय इति तयोर्यौगपद्यसम्भवात्। तदिदं सर्वप्रदानाधिकरणवार्त्तिके स्थितम्।

प्रधानपूर्वकाला प्रतिपत्तिर्यथा—"शकृत्संप्रविध्यति," "लोहितं निरस्यति" इति शकृत्संप्रवेधनलोहितनिरसने। इदमपि "पशावनालम्भाल्लोहितशकृतोरकर्मत्वम्" इत्यधिकरणे स्थितम्।

That purification is concurrent with the principal sacrifice. For the injunction being, "One should perform *homa* when the word '*vauṣaṭ*' has been uttered" (*Śat. Br.* II. IV. iii. 37, etc.), *homa* should be performed by the priest called *adhvaryu* at the next moment of the utterance of the word '*vauṣaṭ*.' The sacrifice also is to be performed at that very moment by the sacrificer, on its being recalled by the utterance of the word '*vauṣaṭ*,' which is meant to remind one of the sacrifice. Hence the simultaneity of the two is possible. All this is established in the gloss[1] on the topic relating to 'the offering of the whole.'

Disposal antecedent to the principal sacrifice is exemplified by the picking out of the (sacrificed animal's) excreta and removal of the blood, enjoined by the texts, "One should pick out the excreta," and "One should remove the blood." This, too, is established under the topic, "The animal not being killed for the sake of the excreta and blood, these are not incentives to the sacrifice" (*Pū. Mī. Sū.* IV. i. 27).

[[1] The commentary (in prose) called *Tantra-Vārttika* by Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, on *Pū. Mī. Sū.* The topic in question comprises III. iv. 37-41 of the *Sūtras*, where the decision is that not the whole cake, but a part of it, is to be offered in the fire.]

उपयोक्ष्यमाणसंस्कारोऽप्यनेकविधः—साक्षाद्विनियुक्तसंस्कारः, साक्षाद्विनियुक्तस्य यदुपकारकं तत्संस्कारः, विनियोक्ष्यमाणसंस्कारश्चेति। तत्र आद्यो यथा "व्रीहीनवहन्ति" इत्यादौ "व्रीहिभिर्यजेत" इति वाक्यविनियुक्तव्रीहीणामवहननसंस्कारः। द्वितीयो यथा "वत्समालभेत" इति। दोहाङ्गत्वेन साक्षाद्विनियुक्तस्य गोद्रव्यस्योपकारको यो वत्सः तत्संस्कारकमिदमालम्भनम्। तृतीयो यथा "तप्ते पयसि दध्यानयति" इत्यत्र "सा वैश्वदेव्यामिक्षा" इति वाक्येन तच्छब्देन निर्दिश्य वैश्वदेवयागाङ्गत्वेन विनियोक्ष्यमाणं यत्पयस्तत्संस्कारकत्वात् विनियोक्ष्यमाणसंस्कारकं दध्यानयनम्।

Purification of what is to be used is also manifold, viz., purification of what has been directly prescribed,[1] that of something helpful to what has been directly prescribed, and purification of what is going to be prescribed. Of these, an example of the first is: In the sentence, "One should thresh the rice grains," etc., threshing is a purification of the rice grains prescribed by the sentence, "One should sacrifice with rice grains." The second is exemplified by the sentence: "One should touch the calf." This touching is a purification of the calf that is helpful to the material, cow, which is directly prescribed as a subsidiary to milking. An instance of the third is this: In the sentence, "When the milk has been heated, one should mix curd with it" (*Mai. S.* I. x. 1), the mixing of the curd is a purification of the milk which is going to be prescribed by the sentence, "That is the fresh cheese relating to the Viśvadevas" (*Ibid.*), as a subsidiary to the sacrifice relating to the Viśvadevas, being referred to by the word 'that.'

[[1] As a subsidiary to some rite.]

पशुपुरोडाशयागस्तूपयुक्तोपयोक्ष्यमाणदेवतासंस्कारार्थः, त्यागांशे अदृष्टार्थश्च। अत्र तत्संस्कार्याग्नीषोमदेवताया वपायागे उपयुक्तत्वात्, हृदयाद्यङ्गयागेषु उपयोक्ष्यमाणत्वाच्च। स्विष्टकृद्यागो द्रव्यांशे देवतांशे चोपयुक्तसंस्कारार्थः, त्यागांशे अदृष्टार्थश्च। सूक्तवाकसाधनकं प्रहरणमपि तथैव। उत्तमप्रयाजो यक्ष्यमाणदेवतासंस्कारत्वात् तदंशे उपयोक्ष्यमाणसंस्कारः, इतरांशे अदृष्टार्थः। हृदयादिहविर्यागात्पूर्वं क्रियमाणो वसाहोमोऽपि वसांशे प्रतिपत्तिः, इतरांशे अदृष्टार्थ इत्याद्यूह्यम्।

The sacrifice with cakes in an animal sacrifice, however, is for the purification of the deities who have played their part in the sacrifice and are still to do so, and in respect of the dedication it is for generating the unique result; for the deities Fire and Moon, whom that sacrifice is meant to purify, have played their part in the sacrifice with the omentum, and they are still to do so in the sacrifices with the heart and other parts of the animal. The sacrifice called Sviṣṭakṛt is, in respect of both materials and deities, for the purification of what has been used, while in respect of the dedication it is for generating the unique result. The same is the case with the oblation[1] (of the sheaf of *kuśa* grass) to the utterance of the hymns called Sūktavāka. Since the final Prayāja[2] is a purification of the deity in whose honour it is to be performed, in respect of that it is a purification of what is to be used, while in other respects[3] it is for generating the unique result. The *homa* with fat that is performed before the sacrifice with oblations such as the (animal's) heart, is also disposal in respect of the fat, while in other respects[4] it is for generating the unique result, and so on, we must understand.

[[1] In the new- and full-moon sacrifices, this *homa* is enjoined by the text, "One should offer the sheaf of *kuśa* grass to the utterance of the Sūktavāka hymns." Its deities are those already invoked in the main sacrifice, and the sheaf of *kuśa* grass has been used by pouring ghee upon it. Thus the *homa* purifies the deities and the material—both, however, visible purposes.

[2] The last of the five Prayājas, enjoined by the text, "One should perform the sacrifice to the deity Svāhākāra.

[3], [4] That is, in respect of the dedication and the offering.]

केचित्तु—उपयोक्ष्यमाणसंस्कारभिन्नसंस्कारकर्मत्वं प्रतिपत्तिकर्मत्वम्; चतुरवत्तद्रव्यस्य होमेन भस्मीभूतस्य होमे उपयोक्ष्यमाणत्वाभावात् तद्भिन्नत्वं होमेऽस्तीति लक्षणसङ्गतिरित्याहुः ।

अत्रायं विशेषः—अर्थकर्मणि द्रव्यापेक्षया कर्मणः प्राधान्यम्, कर्मणि द्रव्यस्य गुणत्वम्। यथा अग्निहोत्रादौ दध्यादेर्गुणत्वम्। गुणकर्मणि द्रव्यस्य प्राधान्यम्, द्रव्ये च कर्मणो गुणत्वम्। यथा "व्रीहीन् प्रोक्षति, अवहन्ति" इत्यादौ द्वितीयया व्रीहीणां क्रियासाध्यत्वप्रतीतेः क्रियापेक्षया द्रव्यस्य प्राधान्यम्, प्रोक्षणादिक्रियायास्तदपेक्षया गुणत्वमिति।

Some, however, say: The rite of disposal is any rite of purification other than the purification of what is to be used. Since the material of the quadruple oblation, which is burnt to ashes by *homa,* can no longer be used in the latter, this *homa* is other than what is to be used. Hence the definition can apply there.

Here there is this difference: In a principal rite (*artha-karman*) the rite is more important than the material, which is an accessory to the rite; as, in the Agnihotra, for instance, curd etc. are accessories. In a subsidiary rite (*guṇa-karman*), however, the material is more important, and the rite is subsidiary to the material. As, in sentences like, "One should sprinkle the rice grains," and "One should thresh the rice grains," since from the accusative case-ending it is clear that the rice grains will be subjected to some action, the material is more important than the action, while the act of sprinkling and so on is subsidiary to it.

A FOURFOLD DIVISION OF SUBSIDIARY RITES

पुनरपि गुणकर्म चतुर्विधम्—उत्पत्त्याप्तिविकृतिसंस्कृतिभेदात्। तत्रोत्पत्तिसंस्कारो यथा "अग्नीनादधीत" इति। मन्त्रविशेषैः सम्भारेषु निधापिता आहवनीयादय उत्पद्यन्त इत्याहव-

नीयाद्युत्पत्तिहेतुभूतसंस्कारजनकत्वात् आधानस्य उत्पत्तिसंस्कारत्वम्। आप्तिसंस्कारो यथा "स्वाध्यायोऽध्येतव्यः" इति। अध्ययनेन स्वाध्याय आप्यत इत्याप्तिसंस्कारोऽयम्। विकृतिर्यथा "व्रीहीनवहन्ति" इति। व्रीहिगतवैतुष्यरूपविकृतिजनकत्वादवहननं विकृतिसंस्कारः। संस्कृतिर्यथा "व्रीहीन् प्रोक्षति" इति। अत्र प्रोक्षणस्य व्रीहिगतातिशयरूपसंस्कृतिजनकत्वात् संस्कृतिरूपगुणकर्मत्वम्। अत्राधानमध्ययनञ्च स्वतन्त्रं गुणकर्म, न तु क्रत्वङ्गम्। प्रोक्षणादिकं सर्वं क्रत्वङ्गं गुणकर्मेति ध्येयम्।

Subsidiary rites are again fourfold, being divided into origination, attainment, modification and consecration. Of these, an example of the purification called origination is found in the passage, "One should place the fire." Since fires such as the Āhavanīya originate by being placed on a stack (of fuel) to the utterance of sacred texts, the placing, being the cause of purification that leads to the origination of fires such as the Āhavanīya, is a purification called origination. The purification called attainment is exemplified by the sentence, "One's own Vedas[1] should be studied" (*Tai. Ā*. II. xv. 7). The Vedas of one's own school are attained through study; hence this is a purification called attainment. An example of modification is the sentence, "One should thresh the rice grains." Since threshing causes a change, viz., husking, in the paddy, it is a purification called modification. An instance of consecration is the sentence, "One should sprinkle the rice grains." Here, since the sprinkling causes consecration in the form of an added virtue[2] in the rice grains, it is a subsidiary rite of the nature of consecration. Of these, the placing (of the fire) and study, we must understand, are independent subsidiary rites, not accessories to the sacrifice; but sprinkling and the rest are all subsidiary rites that are accessories to the sacrifice.

[[1] *Svādhyāya*, the particular recension of the Vedas traditionally handed down in one's own family.

[2] The unique result.]

अर्थकर्म त्रिविधम्—नित्यनैमित्तिककाम्यभेदात्। तत्र "यावज्जीवमग्निहोत्रं जुहोति," "सायं जुहोति," "प्रातर्जुहोति" इति जीवता पुरुषेण सायंप्रातःकालयोर्नियमेन कर्तव्यतया अवगतमग्निहोत्रादिकं नित्यम्। "अग्नये पथिकृते पुरोडाशमष्टाकपालं निर्वपेत्" इति दर्शपूर्णमासातिपत्तिनिमित्तकपथिकृदिष्ट्यादिकं नैमित्तिकम्।

Principal rites are threefold, being divided into regular, occasional and optional rites. Of these, the Agnihotra etc. are regular rites, since from sentences like, "One should offer the Agnihotra for life," "One should perform *homa* in the evenings" (*Tai. Br.* II. I. ix. 2), and "One should perform *homa* in the mornings" (*Ibid.* II. I. ii. 7, 8), we know that such rites are to be unfailingly performed every evening and morning by a person as long as he lives. The *iṣṭi* sacrifice known as Pathikṛt, occasioned by the non-performance of the new- and full-moon sacrifices at the proper time, and other such sacrifices are occasional rites, as we know from sentences like, "One should set apart a cake baked on eight thin tiles for the Fire called Pathikṛt (maker of the way)" (*Tai.* S. II. II. ii. I; *Tai. Br.* I. IV. iv. 10).

नित्यनैमित्तिकयोरकरणे प्रत्यवाय एव, कृते फलं नास्तीति केचित्। अन्ये तु दुरितनिवृत्तिः फलमस्ति, "नित्यनैमित्तिकैरेव कुर्वाणो दुरितक्षयम्" इत्यादिवाक्यैः प्रत्यवायनिवृत्तेः फलत्वेन श्रूयमाणत्वात्। न चैवं तयोरपि काम्यत्वापत्तिः, फलवत्त्वादिति वाच्यम्; फलकामनापूर्वकानुष्ठानाभावात्, तत्तद्विधिवाक्ये फल-

काममुद्दिश्य तदर्थफलसाधनत्वेन विधानाभावाच्च काम्यत्वानुपपत्तेः ।

Some[1] say that the non-performance of the regular and occasional rites inevitably leads to demerit, but their performance produces no result. Others,[2] however, maintain that it does produce a result, viz., the destruction of demerit; for sentences like, "Destroying demerit by means of the regular and occasional rites alone," state the destruction of demerit as the result. It cannot be urged that in that case they, too, will become optional rites, since they produce a result; for they are not performed with the desire of obtaining results, and they are not prescribed, in the sentences enjoining them, with reference to a person desiring results, as means to his attaining them; hence they cannot be optional rites.

[[1] The followers of Prabhākara.
[2] The followers of Kumārila Bhaṭṭa.]

काम्यमपि कर्म त्रिविधम्—केवलमैहिकफलकम्, आमुष्मिकफलकम्, ऐहिकामुष्मिकफलकञ्चेति । तत्राद्यं यथा कारीर्यादि । तत् तत्समयवर्तिशुष्यत्सस्यसञ्जीवनहेतुवृष्टिकामिना क्रियते, न कालान्तरभाविवृष्टिकामेन, जन्मान्तरीयवृष्टिकामेन वा । केवलामुष्मिकफलकं यथा स्वर्गाद्यर्थं दर्शपूर्णमासादिकम् । स्वर्गस्य इहलोकभोग्यत्वाभावात् । ऐहिकामुष्मिकसाधारणफलकं यथा “वायव्यं श्वेतमालभेत भूतिकामः” इति भूत्यादिफलकमित्यन्यत्र विस्तरः ।

Optional rites, too, are threefold, viz., those producing results only in this life, those producing results in a future life, and those producing results both here and hereafter. Of these, the first is represented by sacrifices like the Kārīrī. The latter are performed by a person desiring rain that will revive the drying crops of the time, not by one who wants rain at some future time or in some future birth. Instances of rites producing results only in a future life are the new- and full-moon sacrifices, for attaining heaven; for heaven cannot be enjoyed in this life. Rites producing results both here and hereafter are illustrated by those that cause prosperity etc., as stated in the sentence, "One who desires prosperity should touch the white animal (a goat) relating to the deity Wind" (*Tai. S.* II. I. i. I). All this is dealt with at length in other books.[1]

[1] Such as the *Tantra-Vārttika.*]

ननु दर्शपूर्णमासादिकर्मणां व्रीह्यादिद्रव्याणाञ्च प्रत्यक्षत्वेन लौकिकत्वात् कथं वेदस्यालौकिकार्थबोधकत्वमिति चेत् , न। कर्मणां प्रत्यक्षत्वेऽपि तेषां स्वर्गादिफलसाधनत्वमप्रत्यक्षमिति तत्फलसाधनतया तत् कर्म कर्तव्यम्, इत्येवं फलसाधनतया कर्मकर्तव्यताबोधकस्य वेदस्यालौकिकार्थबोधकत्वात्। एवं व्रीह्यादीनां यागादिक्रियासाधनत्वं न प्रत्यक्षवेद्यमिति तद्बोधकस्यापि वेदवाक्यस्यालौकिकार्थबोधकत्वमिति न दोषः।

Objection: Since rites such as the new- and full-moon sacrifices, and materials like rice, are mundane, being visible, how do the Vedas enlighten about supernatural matters?

Reply: Not so; for although the rites are visible, their conduciveness to results like heaven is invisible. Therefore the Vedas, which inculcate the performance of certain rites as means to particular results—that such and such rites should be performed in order to attain such and such results—do enlighten about supernatural matters. Similarly, it cannot be known through perception that rice grains etc. are accessories to acts like sacrifices. Therefore Vedic sentences inculcating these also really enlighten about supernatural matters. Hence the objection does not hold.

HOW AN INJUNCTION FUNCTIONS

इदानीं विधिवाक्यस्य विधायकत्वप्रकारः कथ्यते। तत्र "स्वर्गकामो यजेत" इत्यत्र यजिधातोरुपरितने तप्रत्यये धर्मद्वयमस्ति—आख्यातत्वं लिङ्त्वं चेति। तत्र आख्यातत्वं सर्वलकारसाधारणम्, तदवच्छेदेन लिङ्प्रत्ययः पुरुषप्रवृत्तिरूपामर्थभावनां प्रतिपादयति।

Now the way in which a sentence conveying an injunction performs its function, is being described. Let us take the sentence, "One who desires heaven should perform a sacrifice." Here the suffix *ta*[1] after the root *yaji* has two properties, viz., its character as a verb and its character as being in the optative mood. Of these, the former is common to all the (ten) moods and tenses; in so far as it is a verb, the optative suffix denotes an objective urge (*ārthī bhāvanā*) consisting in a person's inclination.

सा चार्थभावना किं, केन, कथमिति अंशत्रयविशिष्टा। तथाहि यजेत इत्यत्र प्रथमं प्रत्ययेन 'भावयेत्' इति प्रतीयते। सुबन्ताभिहितानां सर्वेषां कारकाणां तिङन्तार्थक्रियान्वयनियमे सति तिङन्तार्थस्य प्राधान्यात्। तत्र च प्रकृत्यर्थापेक्षया प्रत्ययार्थस्य प्राधान्यात् प्रथमं प्रत्ययार्थभावनाया उपस्थितिर्युक्ता। ततः करोतिसमानार्थकभावयतेः सकर्मकत्वात् 'किं भावयेत्' इति कर्माकांक्षायां भिन्नपदोपात्तोऽपि स्वर्गो भाव्यत्वेनान्वेति। भाव्यत्वेन कर्मत्वेनेत्यर्थः, साध्यत्वेनेति यावत्। न तु समानपदोपात्तोऽपि धात्वर्थो भाव्यत्वेनान्वेति। दुःखात्मकस्य यागस्य ईप्सिततमत्वरूपकर्मत्वायोग्यत्वात्। स्वर्गस्य त्वानन्दात्मकत्वेन ईप्सित-

[[1] This is according to Pāṇini. Later grammarians use *ita*.]

तमतया कर्मत्वेनान्वययोग्यत्वात्। ततश्च 'स्वर्गं भावयेत्' इति बोधो भवति।

That objective urge consists of three parts—what, through what and how. To explain: In the word *yajeta* (should sacrifice), first of all the suffix conveys the idea of 'should bring about.' For, since all the cases, designated as words ending in *sup* (attributive inflexions), must invariably be in agreement with verbs, denoted by words ending in *tiṅ* (verbal inflexions), the latter are predominant. Here again, the meaning of the suffix being more important than that of the root, it is but proper that the meaning of the suffix, viz., to bring about, should first flash before the mind. Then, the verb 'to bring about,' which is synonymous with the verb 'to do,' being transitive, there is the expectancy about an object, viz., "What should one bring about?"—and heaven, although presented by a different term, is connected as the thing to be brought about, that is, as an object, or as what is to be realised; but the root-meaning, although presented by the same word, is not connected as the thing to be brought about. For a sacrifice, which is painful by nature, cannot be an object, which is (defined to be) the most covetable thing, while heaven, being of the nature of joy, is a most covetable thing, and as such can be connected (with the action denoted by the suffix) as an object, and that leads to the understanding, "One should realise heaven."

ततः 'केन' इति करणाकांक्षायां समानपदोपात्तो यागः करणत्वेनान्वेति—'यागेन स्वर्गं कुर्यात्' इति। ततः 'कथं यागेन स्वर्गं कुर्यात्' इति कथम्भावाकांक्षायाम् अग्न्यन्वाधानावहननादिजन्यदृष्टोपकारेण प्रयाजादिजनितादृष्टोपकारसहितेन यागेन स्वर्गं कुर्यादिति अग्न्यन्वाधानप्रयाजादिकमङ्गजातम् इतिकर्तव्यतात्वे-

नाऽन्वेति। कथम्भावाकांक्षापूरकत्वमितिकर्तव्यतात्वम्। यथा 'ओदनकामः पचेत्' इत्यत्र लिङा भावना प्रतीयते। किं भावयेदित्याकांक्षायाम् ओदनो भाव्यत्वेनान्वेति, केनेत्याकांक्षायां पाकेनेति लभ्यते, कथमित्याकांक्षायां तृणफूत्कारादिसहितेनेति। ततश्च तृणफूत्काराद्युपकृतेन पाकेन (तेजःसंयोगेन) ओदनं भावयेदिति वाक्यार्थः सम्पद्यते। तद्वद्वेदेऽपि बोध्यम्।

Then, to satisfy the expectancy about the means —"Through what?"—the sacrifice, presented by the same word, is connected as the means, signifying, "One should achieve heaven by means of a sacrifice." Next, to satisfy the expectancy regarding the *modus operandi*—"How should one realise heaven by means of a sacrifice?"—subsidiaries such as the placing of the fire and the sacrifices called Prayāja, are connected as the *modus operandi,* so as to signify: "One should realise heaven by means of a sacrifice, backed by the visible help given by the placing of the fire, the threshing (of rice), etc., and by the invisible help[1] given by sacrifices like the Prayāja. The *modus operandi* is what satisfies the expectancy regarding the how of the thing. As, in the sentence, "One who desires a rice meal should cook," the optative suffix denotes bringing about; to satisfy the expectancy, "What should one bring about?" the food is connected as the thing to be realised; in answer to the query, "By what means?" we get, "Through cooking;" and in answer to the query, "How?" we get, "With (dry) grass, blowing, etc." So the meaning of the sentence is, "One should prepare a rice meal by cooking, that is, by the application of heat, helped by (dry) grass, blowing, etc. Similarly we must understand in the Vedas also.

[[1] In the form of the initial unique result.]

स एव लिङ्प्रत्ययो लिङ्त्वावच्छेदेन शब्दभावनां प्रेरणाख्यामभिधत्ते। लोकेऽपि "गामानय" इत्याचार्यवाक्यश्रवणानन्तरम् 'अयमाचार्यो मां गवानयने प्रेरयति' इति प्रेरणाख्यव्यापारं ज्ञात्वैव शिष्यो गवानयने प्रवर्तत इत्यन्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यां प्रेरणाज्ञानं प्रवृत्तिकारणम्। प्रेरणाज्ञानस्य चान्वयव्यतिरेकाभ्यां लिङादिश्रवणजन्यत्वावधारणात्, लिङादेः प्रेरणायां शक्तिर्लोके गृह्यत इति वेदेऽपि तत्रैव शक्तिकल्पनौचित्यात्। इयांस्तु विशेषः—लोके गवानयनादिप्रवृत्त्यनुकूलः प्रेरणाख्यो व्यापारः प्रयोक्तृपुरुषगताभिप्रायविशेषः। वेदे तु प्रयोक्तृपुरुषाभावात् लिङादिशब्दनिष्ठ एव स इत्यङ्गीक्रियते। अत एव शब्दनिष्ठव्यापारत्वाच्छाब्दी भावनेत्युच्यते, यागहोमादिविषयप्रवृत्तिहेतुत्वात् प्रवर्तना प्रेरणेति चोच्यते।

That very optative suffix, in so far as it is such a suffix, denotes a verbal urge called direction. Even in ordinary life, a pupil, on hearing the teacher's words, "Fetch the cow," understands their function, known as direction, viz., "Here is my teacher directing me to fetch the cow," and only then he sets about fetching the cow. Thus, by the method of agreement and difference,[1] the awareness of a direction is the cause of inclination. And since this awareness is, by the method of agreement and difference, ascertained to be due to the hearing of the optative suffix etc., it is understood in ordinary life that the optative suffix etc. denote a direction; similarly in the Vedas, too, it ought to be assumed that the optative suffix etc. denote just that (i.e., direction). But there is this difference: In ordinary life, the action known as direction, which facilitates the inclination to acts like fetching a cow, is a resolve on the part of a directing person; but in the Vedas, owing to the absence of any directing person, that action is admitted to belong only to words like the optative suffix. Hence, being an action inherent in words, it is called the verbal urge (*śābdi bhāvanā*); and being the cause of an inclination towards matters like sacrifices and *homa,* it is also called an inducement or direction.

[¹ When the presence of something is followed by that of some other thing, it is a case of agreement, and when the absence of a thing is followed by the absence of another, it is a case of difference. For instance, if there are clouds in the sky, there is rain, and if there are no clouds in the sky, there is no rain.]

सैषा शाब्दी भावनापि अंशत्रयविशिष्टा। तत्र पुरुषप्रवृत्तिरूपार्थीभावना भाव्यत्वेनान्वेति, अध्ययनावगतलिङादिकं करणत्वेनान्वेति, अर्थवादप्रतिपाद्यप्राशस्त्यज्ञानमितिकर्तव्यतात्वेनान्वेति। तत्र 'साङ्गवेदाध्येतारोऽधीतव्याकरणनिगमनिरुक्तादिवशाद्व्युत्पत्तिमन्तः पुरुषा अध्ययनगृहीतस्वाध्यायगतलिङादिभिः प्राशस्त्यज्ञानसचिवैर्यागाद्यर्थं स्वकर्तव्यत्वेन बुद्ध्वा यागादीननुतिष्ठेयुः' इति शाब्दभावनाबोधः। अनुतिष्ठेयुः अनुष्ठानं कुर्युरित्यर्थः। अनुष्ठानं प्रवृत्तिः। तेन पुरुषप्रवृत्तेः शब्दभावनाभाव्यत्वमक्षतम्।

This verbal urge, too, has three parts. Here the objective urge, represented by a person's inclination, comes into relation as the thing to be achieved; the optative suffix etc., known through study, comes into relation as the means; and the knowledge of praiseworthiness that is conveyed by corroborative statements comes into relation as the *modus operandi.* So the cognition of the verbal urge takes the following form: "Persons who have studied the Vedas with their branches¹ and have become enlightened by grammar, explanatory texts, etymology, etc. read by them, understand, from the optative suffix etc. which occur in the Vedas of their own school that they have acquired through study, and which are aided by their knowledge of the praiseworthiness (of certain rites), that matters like sacrifices are to be performed by them, and that they should perform them." 'Should perform' means 'should undertake the performance of,' and performance is a form of inclination. So the fact of a person's inclination[2] being caused by the verbal urge is intact.

[[1] They are six, viz., phonetics, ritual, grammar, lexicon, prosody and astronomy.

[2] Which represents the objective urge.]

इयञ्च शब्दभावना ज्योतिष्टोमादिप्रातिस्विकवाक्येषु स्वरूपेण प्रतीयमानाऽपि कर्तव्यत्वेन न प्रतीयते, अर्थभावनाया एव तेषु कर्तव्यत्वावगमात्, किन्तु "स्वाध्यायोऽध्येतव्यः" इति वाक्ये एव कर्तव्यत्वेन प्रतीयते। न चात्रार्थभावनाया एव विधेयत्वमिति वाच्यम्, "स्वाध्यायोऽध्येतव्यः" इति वाक्यस्यार्थभावनाया एव सकलविधिवाक्यस्थशब्दभावनारूपत्वात्।

Although this verbal urge appears in its potential form in each sentence inculcating the Jyotiṣṭoma sacrifice etc., it is not comprehended as something to be done, for it is the objective urge[1] that is felt there as that.[2] But the verbal urge is comprehended as something to be done only in the sentence, "One's own Vedas should be studied" (*Tai. Ā*. II. xv. 7). It cannot be maintained that here the objective urge alone is the thing enjoined, for the objective urge that is present in the sentence, "One's own Vedas should be studied," itself constitutes the verbal urge abiding in all sentences conveying an injunction.

[[1] That is, a person's inclination.

[2] That is, as something to be done.]

तथाहि—अधिपूर्वकात् "इङ् अध्ययने" इति धातोः कर्मणि तव्यप्रत्ययो विहितः। कर्म च स्वाध्यायः प्रधानम्। तत्संस्कारकमध्ययनं गुणकर्म, व्रीहिसंस्कारकप्रोक्षणादिवत्। अध्ययनजनितग्रहणसंस्कारविशिष्टस्वाध्यायस्य प्रयोजनाकांक्षायां स्वाध्यायगतलिङादिविशिष्टवाक्यसामर्थ्यलभ्यं यदनुष्ठानौपयिकं यागादिरूपार्थज्ञानं तदेव दृष्टत्वात्, तत्तत्कर्मानुष्ठानद्वारा स्वर्गादिरूपालौकिकश्रेयःसाधनत्वाच्च प्रयोजनम्, कर्मावबोधं विना कर्मानुष्ठानायोगात्। न त्वदृष्टं प्रयोजनम्, दृष्टफले सम्भवत्यदृष्टफलकल्पनाऽयोगात्।

To explain: (In the sentence quoted), the verb *adhyetavya* (should be studied) is derived by adding the suffix *tavya* in the passive voice to the root *iṅ*, meaning 'to study,' prefixed by *adhi*. The object (changed into nominative in the passive form), viz., one's own Vedas, is predominant. Study, which purifies that, is a subsidiary rite, like sprinkling, for instance, that purifies the rice grains. When an expectancy arises as to the purpose of one's own Vedas, to which is imparted the purification called knowledge produced by study, that purpose is just the knowledge of the meaning (of a Vedic text), for example, a sacrifice, which knowledge is derived from the power of sentences having words with optative suffixes such as *liṅ* that occur in one's own Vedas, and is conducive to performance; for it is something visible, and is a means to supernatural welfare such as heaven, through the performance of particular rites, inasmuch as it is impossible to perform rites without a knowledge of them. But no invisible purpose should be attributed, for it is improper to assume an invisible result when a visible result is possible.

तथाच स्वाध्यायविधिनैव स्वाध्यायगतविधिवाक्यगतलिङादिप्रतिपादिताः सर्वाः शाब्दभावना अंशत्रयविशिष्टाः कर्तव्यत्वेन विधीयन्ते । साङ्गवेदाध्ययनेन व्युत्पन्नाः पुरुषाः अध्ययनगृहीतस्वाध्यायगतलिङादिभिरर्थवादावगतप्राशस्त्यरूपाङ्गसचिवैः फलवद्यागादिकर्तव्यतां बुद्ध्वा यागादीननुतिष्ठेयुरिति । अनुतिष्ठेयुः प्रवृत्तिं कुर्युरित्यर्थः । तत्र पुरुषप्रवृत्तेर्भाव्यत्वेनान्वयात्, अध्ययनावगतलिङादेः करणत्वेनान्वयात्, प्राशस्त्यज्ञानस्येतिकर्तव्यतात्वेनान्वयात्, शब्दभावनाया अपि अंशत्रयवैशिष्ट्यम् अर्थभावनाया इवेष्टम् ।

So by the very injunction about the study of one's own Vedas, all verbal urges with their three parts, denoted by the optative suffix etc. occurring in the sentences conveying injunction that form part of these Vedas, are prescribed as things to be done. In other words, persons enlightened by the study of the Vedas with their branches, understand, from the optative suffix etc. occurring in their own Vedas which they have learnt through study, backed by their subsidiary, praiseworthiness, as known from the corroborative statements (*arthavāda*), that sacrifices etc. producing results are to be performed, and should perform them. 'Should perform,' that is to say, 'should be inclined towards.' Here, since a person's inclination comes into relation as the thing to be done, the optative suffix etc., known from study, do so as the instrument, and the knowledge of praiseworthiness comes into relation as the *modus operandi*, the fact of the verbal urge also possessing three parts, like the objective urge, is acknowledged (by the old masters).

तत्र समीहितस्वर्गादिभाव्यकत्वभानमपि विधिवशादेव । प्रवर्तनापरो विधिः यागादेः पुरुषार्थासाधनत्वे तत्र पुरुषं प्रवर्तयितुं न शक्नोतीति स्वभाव्यपुरुषप्रवृत्तिविषयस्य यागादेः पुरुषाभिलषित-

स्वर्गादिसाधनत्वमापादयति । अन्यथा स्वस्य प्रवर्तनात्वमेव न स्यात्, प्रवृत्तिहेतुव्यापारस्यैव प्रवर्तनात्वात् । लडादिस्थले तु प्रवर्तनात्मकविधेरभावादर्थभावनायाः पुरुषार्थभाव्यकत्वनियमो नास्ति ।

भावनात्वं नाम भवितुः प्रयोजकव्यापारत्वम् । तत्रार्थभावनायां भवितुर्जायमानस्य स्वर्गादेः प्रयोजकव्यापारत्वात् लक्षणसङ्गतिः । शाब्दभावनायामपि पुरुषप्रवृत्तिरूपस्य भवितुः प्रयोजकव्यापारत्वात् लक्षणसङ्गतिः ।

In the objective urge, the cognition of heaven etc. as being the coveted things to be realised, also takes place on account of the injunction alone. If sacrifices etc. were not means to the ends of human life, an injunction, the function of which is to induce, could not persuade a person to perform them. This necessarily proves that sacrifices etc., which are the objects of a person's inclination caused by the injunction, are the means to heaven etc. desired by him. Otherwise the injunction would just cease to be an inducement, for inducement is but an activity that causes inclination. But in the case of suffixes denoting the indicative present tense etc., since there is no injunction, which is of the nature of an inducement, the rule that the objective urge produces the ends of human life, does not apply.

An urge (*bhāvanā*) is a stimulating activity for that which is to take place. Now, the objective urge being a stimulating activity for what is to take place or come into being, viz., heaven etc., the definition applies to it. The verbal urge, too, being a stimulating activity for what is to take place, viz., a person's inclination, the definition is applicable.

ननु "ज्योतिष्टोमेन स्वर्गकामो यजेत" इत्यत्र यागेन स्वर्ग-

भावयेदित्यर्थवर्णने ज्योतिष्टोमपदस्य कथमन्वयः इति चेत्, न। भावनाकरणत्वेनाभिमतयागनामत्वेनान्वयात्—'ज्योतिष्टोमनामकेन यागेन' इति।

कथं तन्नामत्वमिति चेत्, ज्योतिराख्यास्त्रिवृदादिस्तोमा अस्मिन् सन्तीति व्युत्पत्या यागनामत्वात्। यागस्य त्रिवृदादिस्तोमसम्बन्धः केनावगम्यते इति चेत्, न। "त्रिवृत् पञ्चदशः सप्तदश……एतस्य स्तोमाः" इति वाक्यान्तरेण एतच्छब्दार्थस्य तत्सम्बन्धावगमात्। एवं शास्त्रोक्तैस्तत्प्रख्यादिभिर्हेतुभिस्तत्र तत्र नामत्वं बोध्यम्।

Objection: If the sentence, "One who desires heaven should sacrifice through the Jyotiṣṭoma" (i.e., perform that sacrifice), is explained as, "One should realise heaven through the sacrifice," how can the word 'Jyotiṣṭoma' be construed?

Reply: Not so; for it can be construed as being the name of the sacrifice that is considered to be the instrument of that realisation—the construction being, "Through the sacrifice called Jyotiṣṭoma."

Objection: How can the word be a name of the sacrifice?

Reply: By its derivation, viz., that in it there are verse numbers (*stoma*) such as nine,[1] called Jyotis.

Objection: How is it known that the sacrifice is connected with verse numbers such as nine?

Reply: From another sentence, "Nine, fifteen, seventeen, (twenty-one—these verily are those Jyotises which) constitute its verse numbers" (*Tai. Br.* I. v. xi. 1), we understand that what is denoted by the word 'its' refers to that sacrifice. Thus on grounds such as "declarative of that" (*tat-prakhya*) mentioned in this system, we must understand that certain words signify names.

[¹ *Trivṛt*—a unit of three verses being repeated thrice in a particular way.]

FOUR TESTS OF NAMES

शास्त्रे हि तत्प्रख्य-तद्व्यपदेश-यौगिक-वाक्यभेदैश्चतुर्भिर्नामत्वं प्रतिपादितम्। तथाहि—[1]"अग्निहोत्रं जुहोति" इत्यत्र अग्निहोत्रशब्देन अग्निदेवतारूपो गुणो न विधीयते, "अग्निर्ज्योतिर्ज्योतिरग्निः स्वाहेति सायं जुहोति" इति वाक्यविहितेन मन्त्रेण देवतायाः प्राप्तत्वात्। किन्तु अग्निप्रख्यापकम् (अग्निप्रापकं) यच्छास्त्रान्तरम्—"अग्निर्ज्योतिर्ज्योतिरग्निः" इत्यादिकम्, तेन प्राप्तमग्निसम्बन्धं निमित्तीकृत्य 'अग्नये होत्रं होमोऽस्मिन्' इति बहुव्रीहिणा अग्निहोत्रपदस्य होमनामधेयत्वम्।

For in this system there are four grounds to establish that a certain word is a name, viz., declaration of a particular thing, distinctive mention from a particular feature, derivation, and split of the sentence. To explain: In the sentence, "One should offer the Agnihotra" (*Tai. S.* I. v. ix. 1), the word 'Agnihotra' does not enjoin an accessory in the form of the deity Fire, for the deity is already familiar from the sacred text prescribed in the sentence, "One should offer an oblation in the evening, saying, 'Fire is light, and light is Fire—*svāhā*' " (*Mai. S.* I. vi. 10; *Tai. Br.* II. i. ix. 2). But with reference to the relation to the Fire, already familiar from the other text declaring the Fire—i.e., making it known—viz., "Fire is light, and light is Fire," etc., the compound called Bahuvrīhi, expounded as, "There is a *hotra* or offering to the Fire in this," makes the word 'Agnihotra' a name of the *homa*.

न च होमस्य प्रत्ययवाच्यार्थभावनायां करणत्वात् तन्नामत्वे

'अग्निहोत्रेण' इति तृतीया स्यात्, 'ज्योतिष्टोमेन' इतिवदिति वाच्यम्। द्वितीयाया एव लक्षणया करणार्थकत्वात्, 'नासाधितं करणम्' इति न्यायेन असाधितस्य करणत्वायोगात् अर्थात् प्राप्तहोमगतसाध्यत्वानुवादकत्वेन वा द्वितीयोपपत्तेरिति तत्प्रख्यन्यायादत्र नामधेयत्वम्।

It cannot be contended that, since the *homa* is a means to the objective urge[1] denoted by the suffix, if the word in question be a name for the *homa*, then it should be in the instrumental case,[2] viz., 'Agnihotreṇa' (through the Agnihotra), as in the case of the word 'Jyotiṣṭomena' (through the Jyotiṣṭoma sacrifice). For the accusative case-ending can be justified on the ground that it really has by implication the force of the instrumental case-ending, or as a restatement of the fact that the *homa* is to be performed, which is known automatically, inasmuch as on the principle that "a thing that has not itself come into being cannot be an instrument (of something else)," the Agnihotra which is yet to be cannot be an instrument. Hence the word 'Agnihotra' is here a name, on the principle of "declaration of a particular thing."

[[1] That is, a person's inclination.
[2] Instead of the accusative.]

तथा "श्येनेनाभिचरन्यजेत" इत्यत्र श्येनपदं यागनामधेयम्, न तु यागाङ्गत्वेन श्येनपक्षिरूपगुणविधिः। "यथा वै श्येनो निपत्यादत्ते एवमेवायं द्विषन्तं भ्रातृव्यं निपत्यादत्ते यमभिचरति श्येनेन" इत्युपमानोपमेयव्यपदेशानुपपत्तिप्रसङ्गात्। 'श्येनपक्षी यथा पक्ष्यन्तरं निपत्यादत्ते एवमयमपि श्येननामकः कर्मविशेषो भ्रातृव्यं शत्रुं निपत्यादत्ते' इति व्यपदेशः कर्मनामत्वपक्ष एव युज्यते। यागाङ्गतया श्येनपक्षिविधौ तु स्वस्य स्वेनैवोपमानोपमेयभावः स्यात्।

स चायुक्तः । तस्माच्छ्येनतुल्यतान्यपदेशाच्छ्येनपदं कर्मनामधेयम् । ततश्च 'अभिचरन् शत्रुवधकामः श्येननामकेन यागेन अभिचारं भावयेत्' इति वाक्यार्थः ।

Similarly, in the sentence, "He who wants to kill (his enemy) should sacrifice through the Ṡyena" (*Ṣaḍ. Br*. III. viii. 2), the word 'Ṡyena' is the name of a sacrifice, and not an injunction relating to an accessory, viz., a hawk, as a subsidiary to a sacrifice; for then the distinctive mention of something being likened to some other thing would be inconsistent in the sentence, "Just as a hawk swoops on and seizes (its prey), so does this man swoop on and seize his spiteful enemy—whom he desires to kill through the Ṡyena (sacrifice)" (*Ibid*. III. viii. 3). As a hawk swoops on and seizes another bird, so does this particular rite called Ṡyena swoop on and seize one's enemy—this distinctive mention would be consistent only if 'Ṡyena' was the name of a rite. Were it, however, an injunction about a hawk as being a subsidiary to a sacrifice, an identical thing would be likened to itself, which is not proper. Hence, on account of the distinctive mention of likeness to a hawk, the word 'Ṡyena' is the name of a rite. Therefore the sentence means, "He who desires to kill his enemy, should effect the killing through the sacrifice called Ṡyena."

नन्वेवमप्यभिचारस्यापि वेदोक्तत्वात् आभिचारिके कर्मण्यास्तिकानामपि प्रवृत्तिः स्यादिति चेत्, न। वेदोक्तोऽप्यभिचारो वेदविहितो न भवति, फलत्वात्। 'फलं न विधेयं किन्तु फलमुद्दिश्य तत्साधनत्वेन कर्मैव विधेयम्' इति सिद्धान्तात्। अतोऽभिचारस्याविहितत्वेन प्रत्यवायजनकत्वम् ।

Objection: Even in that case, since killing, too, is mentioned in the Vedas, believers[1] (*āstikas*) as well would feel inclined towards rites relating to killing.

Reply: No; killing, although mentioned in the Vedas, is not enjoined by them, since it is a result, and it has been decided (in this system) that "results are not enjoined, but only rites as means to certain desired results."[2] Hence killing, not being enjoined, produces demerit.

[[1] Those who believe in God and an after-life inculcated in the Vedas.

[2] Which automatically follow from those means. For the idea see *Pū. Mī. Sū.* IV. i. 2*b*.]

एवम् "उद्भिदा यजेत पशुकामः" इत्यत्र पशुरूपफलाय विधित्सितस्य यागस्य उद्भित्पदं नामधेयम्, न तु यथाकथञ्चित् प्राप्तयागमुद्दिश्य तदङ्गतयोद्भिद्रूपगुणविधिः। दध्यादिवदुद्भिदात्मकस्य गुणस्याप्रसिद्धत्वात्। यागे तु 'उद्भिद्यते फलमनेन' इति योगसम्भवाद्यागनामत्वम्।

Similarly, in the sentence, "One who desires cattle should sacrifice through the Udbhid" (*Tāṇ. Br.* XIX. vii. 2), the word 'Udbhid' is the name of a sacrifice sought to be enjoined for attaining animals as results, and not an injunction regarding an accessory called Udbhid, as a subsidiary to a sacrifice somehow already known; for there is no accessory called Udbhid—like curd etc. In the case of a sacrifice, however, since the derivation is possible that "it shoots up (*udbhid*) a result," the word can be the name of a sacrifice.

ननु 'उद्भिद्यते भूमिरनेन' इति योगवशेन खनित्रादावप्युद्भिदः प्रयोगसम्भवात् खनित्रादिगुणविधिः किं न स्यादिति चेत्, न। एतादृशस्थले गुणविधिः क्वापि वक्तुं न शक्यते। विरुद्धत्रिक-

द्वयसमावेशाख्यदोषप्रसङ्गात्। तथाहि—“उद्भिदा यजेत पशुकामः” इत्यत्र मानान्तरेणाप्राप्तस्य यागस्यानुवादासम्भवात् पशुकर्मकभावनायां करणत्वेन यागो विधेयः—‘यागेन पशून् भावयेत्’ इति। ततश्च यागस्य विधेयत्वम्, फलं प्रति शेपतया प्रतीयमानत्वाद्गुणत्वम्—शेषतया अङ्गतयेत्यर्थः—फलसिद्ध्यर्थं पुंसाऽनुष्ठीयमानत्वादुपादेयत्वमिति विधेयत्वगुणत्वोपादेयत्वात्मकमेकं त्रिकं यागेऽस्ति। तथा यागोद्देशेनोद्भिद्गुणविधौ विधित्सितगुणापेक्षया प्राधान्यम्, उद्देश्यत्वम्, अनुवाद्यत्वञ्चेति द्वितीयं त्रिकम्। तदेतत् त्रिकद्वयं परस्परविरुद्धम् एकस्मिन् यागे प्रसज्येत। अतो न गुणविधिः।

Objection: Since on account of the derivation, "It digs up (*udbhid*) the earth," the word 'Udbhid' may refer to a shovel etc., why should it not mean an accessory such as a shovel?

Reply: No, for in a case like this nowhere can an injunction regarding an accessory be maintained, since it would give rise to the defect called 'juxtaposition of two opposing triads.' To explain: In the sentence, "One who desires cattle should sacrifice through the Udbhid" (*Tāṇ. Br*. XIX. vii. 2), since restatement of a sacrifice not known through some other source is not possible, a sacrifice serving as a means to the realisation of cattle as a result is enjoined —the construction being, "One should realise cattle through a sacrifice." Hence the sacrifice is something that is enjoined; being cognised as an auxiliary to a result, it is an accessory—'as an auxiliary,' that is, as a subsidiary—and since it is used by a person for attaining some result, it is something to be utilised. Thus a sacrifice has one triad (of characteristics) consisting in its being enjoined, being an accessory and being utilised.

Similarly, if Udbhid be an accessory enjoined with reference to a sacrifice, then the latter is more important than the accessory sought to be enjoined, it is something (known) to which reference is made, and it is something restated; this is the second triad (of characteristics) in a sacrifice. And these two triads, opposed to each other, would apply to one and the same sacrifice. Hence the instance cited is not an injunction regarding an accessory.

न च "सोमेन यजेत" इत्यत्र विरुद्धत्रिकं विनैव सोमशब्दस्य सोमवति यागे लक्षणामङ्गीकृत्य 'सोमवता यागेनेष्टं भावयेत्' इति सोमविशिष्टयागविधानाद्यथा सोमरूपगुणविधिः, तद्वदुद्भित्पदस्यापि मत्वर्थलक्षणयाऽत्रोद्भिद्गुणविशिष्टयागविधिः स्यादिति वाच्यम्। सोमादौ गत्यन्तराभावात् मत्वर्थलत्तणया विशिष्टविध्यङ्गीकारात्। उद्भिदादौ नामत्वेन गतिसम्भवाद्विशिष्टविध्यङ्गीकारायोगात्। तस्माद्योगवशादुद्भिदादीनां नामत्वम्।

It cannot be urged that just as in the sentence, "One should sacrifice with the *soma*," even without the mutually opposed triads, the word '*soma*' is admitted to denote by implication a sacrifice that has the *soma* (juice) (for its characteristic), and we understand that a sacrifice characterised by the *soma* is enjoined—the sentence meaning, "One should realise one's desired object by means of the sacrifice characterised by the *soma*," so that it is an injunction regarding an accessory, viz., the *soma*, similarly, here, the word 'udbhid' meaning by implication something possessing that characteristic, the sentence may well be an injunction regarding a sacrifice with a characteristic called Udbhid as its accessory. For, in the case of '*soma*' etc., there being no alternative, an injunction regarding something possessing a particular characteristic is admitted by attributing to those words the implied meaning of 'possessing a certain characteristic.' But in the case of words such as 'udbhid,' since there is the possible alternative of treating them as names, it is improper to admit an injunction regarding something possessing a certain characteristic. Therefore, Udbhid and the like are names by virtue of derivation.

तथा "चित्रया यजेत पशुकामः" इत्यत्र चित्रापदं प्राजापत्यनामधेयम्। "दधिमधुघृतमापो धानास्तण्डुलास्तत्संसृष्टं प्राजापत्यम्" इत्यत्र 'तत्संसृष्टं प्राजापत्यम्' इति सामानाधिकरण्याद्दध्यादिद्रव्यषट्कस्य प्रजापतिदेवतासम्बन्धः श्रुतः तेनानुमितो यागो विधीयते। विहितस्य यागस्य फलाकांक्षायां "चित्रया यजेत" इति वाक्यं फलसम्बन्धविधायकम्। तत्र फलार्थत्वेन पुनर्विधिरिति तस्य प्राजापत्ययागस्य दध्यादिविचित्रद्रव्यकत्वात् चित्रापदं कर्मनामधेयम्; न तु "अग्नीषोमीयं पशुमालभेत" इति वाक्यप्राप्तं पशुयागं 'यजेत' इत्यनूद्य चित्रत्वस्त्रीत्वरूपगुणद्वयविधानम्। मानान्तरप्राप्तं कर्मोद्दिश्य तत्रानेकगुणविधाने वाक्यभेदात्। तदुक्तम् "प्राप्ते कर्मणि नानेको विधातुं शक्यते गुणः" इति। मानान्तराप्राप्ते कर्मणि त्वनेकदेवताऽष्टाकपालपुरोडाशामावास्यापौर्णमास्याद्यनेकगुणविशिष्टो द्रव्यदेवतासम्बन्धेनानुमितो यागो विधीयते इति सिद्धान्तः। तदुक्तम् "अप्राप्ते तु विधीयन्ते बहवोऽप्येकयत्नतः" इति।

Likewise, in the sentence, "One who desires cattle should sacrifice through the Citrā" (*Tai. S.* II. IV. vi. 1), the word 'Citrā' is the name of the sacrifice relating to Prajāpati. In the sentence, "Curd, honey, ghee, water, fried barley and rice—associated with these is the sacrifice relating to Prajāpati," from the co-ordination (of the subject and predicate) in the last part of the sentence, we understand that a sacrifice inferred from the expressed relation of the six materials beginning with curd to the deity called Prajāpati, is enjoined. To satisfy the expectancy regarding the result of the enjoined sacrifice, the sentence, "One who desires cattle should sacrifice through the Citrā," lays down the relation (of the rite) to the result. Here, there is a further injunction for the sake of the result, and therefore, inasmuch as that sacrifice relating to Prajāpati consists of diverse (*vicitra*) materials such as curd, the word 'Citrā' is the name of a rite; not that restating, through the words 'should sacrifice,' the animal sacrifice known from the sentence, "One should kill the animal relating to the Fire and the Moon," two accessories, viz., diversity and femininity, are enjoined. For if more accessories than one are enjoined with reference to a rite already known from some other source, it would create a split of the sentence. As it has been said, "With regard to a rite already known, more than one accessory cannot be enjoined" (*Tan. Vār.* II. ii. 6). But with regard to a rite not known from any other source, the decision is that a sacrifice possessing multiple characteristics such as many deities, a cake baked on eight thin tiles and the new- or full-moon day, and inferred from its relation to materials and deities, is enjoined. As it has been said, "But with regard to an unknown rite, many accessories even are enjoined in one effort"[1] (*Ibid.*).

[[1] That is, in a single sentence uttered with one effort.]

अथ—यथा "पशुना यजेत" इत्यत्र मानान्तरप्राप्तयागमुद्दिश्य तदङ्गतया 'पशुना' इत्येकपदोपात्तानां पशुद्रव्यतद्गतलिङ्गसंख्यानां त्रयाणां वाक्यभेदं विनैव विधिरङ्गीकृतः, तद्वदत्राप्येकपदोपात्त-

चित्रत्वस्त्रीत्वविशेषितपशुद्रव्यकारकस्य विधानान्न वाक्यभेदः। अत एव तत्र विधेयस्य पशोरुपादेयत्वात् तद्गतमेकत्वं यज्ञाङ्गतया विवक्षितमित्येकेनैव पशुना यष्टव्यम्, "ग्रहं संमार्ष्टि" इत्यत्र उद्देश्यगतत्वादेकत्वमविवक्षितमिति सिद्धान्तप्रवादः।

Objection: Just as in the sentence, "One should sacrifice with an animal," with reference to a sacrifice already known from some other source, an injunction is admitted, without a split of the sentence, regarding three things, viz., the material, that is, animal, and its sex and number—all cognised from the same phrase 'with an animal'—as subsidiaries to that sacrifice, similarly, here also a constituent of the sacrifice, viz., the material animal, characterised by variegatedness and femininity—cognised from the same phrase[1]—being enjoined, there is no split of the sentence. For this very reason, since the animal which is enjoined is something that is utilised, its unity is sought to be conveyed as a subsidiary to the sacrifice; hence the sacrifice should be performed with only one animal. In the sentence, "One should scour the sacrificial cup," however, the unity is not sought to be conveyed, since it relates to a matter under reference (*uddeśya*).[2] Such is the traditional decision in this system.

[[1] 'Through the Citrā.'
[2] That about which a predication is made.]

कथम्? "ग्रहं संमार्ष्टि" इत्यत्र 'ग्रहम्' इति द्वितीयया ग्रहस्येप्सिततमत्वेनोद्देश्यत्वात् प्रयोजनवत्त्वाच्च प्राधान्यं गम्यते। संमार्गस्तु ग्रहं प्रति गुणभूतः। 'प्रतिप्रधानं गुण आवर्तनीयः' इति न्यायात् 'यावन्तो ग्रहास्तेषां सर्वेषां संमार्गः' इति निश्चये सति, 'कति ग्रहाः संमार्जनीयाः' इति बुभुत्साया अभावादुद्देश्यगतमेकत्वं श्रूयमाणमप्यविवक्षितम्। यद्युच्येत "नेदमुद्देश्यगतं किन्तु

स्त्वयं विधेयम्—'ग्रहं संमृज्यात्, तं चैकम्' इति, तथा सति विधेयभेदाद्वाक्यभेदः स्यात्। तथा बुभुत्साया अभावात् विधानायोगाच्चोद्देश्यगता संख्या न विवक्षिता। उद्देश्यगतमपि विशेषणं किञ्चिद्विवक्षितं यस्य विशेषणस्य विवक्षां विना उद्देश्यप्रतीतिर्न पर्यवस्यति। यथा तत्रैव ग्रहत्वं विवक्षितम्, तद्विवक्षां विना उद्देश्यस्वरूपस्य ज्ञातुमशक्यत्वात्। तेन ग्रहजातीयसाधनकसोमयागापूर्वार्थत्वाच्चमसेषु न संमार्ग इति स्थितम्।

How? In the sentence, "One should scour the sacrificial cup," from the accusative case in the word 'cup,' the cup, being what is most desired, is a matter under reference, and its predominance is understood from this fact as also from its possessing utility. The scouring, however, is an accessory to the cup. For on the principle, "With regard to each predominant item the accessory is to be repeated," we know for certain that all the sacrificial cups that are there, are to be scoured. Consequently, there being no curiosity as to how many cups are to be scoured, the unity pertaining to the matter under reference, although expressed, is not sought to be conveyed. If it be urged that the unity does not relate to the matter under reference, but is itself a predicate, meaning, "One should scour the sacrificial cup and that, too, one," then an extra thing being enjoined, it would create a split of the sentence. Similarly, an injunction also not being in order on account of the absence of curiosity, the number relating to the matter under reference is sought to be conveyed.[1] Some characteristic of the matter under reference even may be sought to be conveyed, but it should be such that without its being conveyed, the matter under reference itself would not be intelligible. As, in the very instance cited, the special character of the sacrificial cup (*grahatva*) is sought to be conveyed, for unless this is done, it would be impossible to know the real nature of the matter under reference.[2] Therefore it is established[3] that, since the scouring is for producing the unique result in a *soma* sacrifice, an accessory to which is the species of sacrificial cups (*graha*), it is not to be performed with regard to sacrificial bowls (*camasa*).

[[1] In *Pū. Mī. Sū.* III. i. 14.

[2] Viz., the cup.

[3] In *Pū. Mī. Sū.* III. i. 17.]

"पशुना यजेत" इत्यत्र तु यागं प्रति पशुर्विधेयत्वाद्गुणभूतः। प्रतिगुणं प्रधानावृत्तिर्नास्तीति कियद्भिः पशुभिः यागः कर्तव्य इत्याकांक्षायाम् एकवचनेन प्रतीयमानं विधेयगतमेकत्वं विवक्षितम्, बुभुत्सितत्वात्।

किञ्च लिङ्गसंख्याविशेषितस्य पशुद्रव्यरूपकारकस्य एकपदोपात्तस्य विधेयत्वाद्विधेयपशुद्वारा तद्गतलिङ्गसंख्यादेरपि क्रियाङ्गत्वादेकत्वं विवक्षितम्।

But in the sentence, "One should sacrifice with an animal," the animal, being the thing enjoined, is an accessory to the sacrifice. Since the principal item is not to be repeated with each accessory, there is the expectancy regarding how many animals would be required for the sacrifice, and to satisfy this, the unity of the thing enjoined, which is obvious from the singular number, is sought to be conveyed,[1] since one desires to know about it.

Moreover, since the material animal, which is a constituent of the sacrifice, which is specified in respect of sex and number, and which is cognised from the same word, is the thing enjoined, through the enjoined animal its sex and number are also subsidiaries to the rite, and therefore the unity of the animal is sought to be conveyed.

[[1] *Ibid.* IV. i. 15.]

अथवा तृतीयया विभक्त्याऽभिहितयोर्लिङ्गसंख्ययोर्विभक्त्यभिहिततया करणकारकशक्त्याऽऽत्मसात्कृतयोः प्रातिपदिकार्थपशुद्रव्येण सम्बन्धमनादृत्य तद्वदेव साक्षात् क्रियाङ्गत्वेन विधाने सति पश्चादरुणैकहायनीन्यायेन परस्परमन्वयः—यागाङ्गत्वेन विहितो यः पशुः स एकः पुमांश्चेति। यथा "अरुणया पिङ्गाक्ष्या एकहायन्या गवा सोमं क्रीणाति" इत्यत्र कारकाणां क्रियान्वयनियमात् करणविभक्तिभिरारुण्यपिङ्गाक्षीत्वादीनां चतुर्णां परस्परमनन्वितानामेव सोमक्रयणाङ्गत्वेन अन्वये सति आरुण्यादेर्गुणस्यामूर्तस्य स्वतः क्रियासाधनत्वायोगात् क्रियासाधनैकहायनीगोपरिच्छेदकत्वेन पश्चात् परस्परं पार्ष्णिकान्वयः—या एकहायनी गौः सा पिङ्गाक्षी अरुणेति, तद्वत्।

Or, the sex and number denoted by the instrumental case-ending and appropriated by the power of the instrumental case denoted by that case-ending, may, to the disregard of their relation to the meaning of the stem, viz., the material animal, be, just like the latter, directly enjoined as subsidiaries to the rite, and then mutually related on the analogy of "the red, one-year-old," etc., so as to mean that the animal that is enjoined as a subsidiary to the sacrifice is one and a male. To explain: In the sentence, "One should buy the *soma* creeper in exchange for a red, tawny-eyed, one-year-old cow," since the rule is that cases should be construed with the verb, the four items, viz., redness, tawny-eyedness and so on, are related, on account of their instrumental case-endings, as subsidiaries to the buying of the *soma* creeper, without at all being construed with one another. And since redness etc. being attributes[1] and formless, cannot directly be the means to a rite, they, as limiting the one-year-old cow which is the means to the rite, are afterwards[2] connected with each other by a subsequent relation, meaning: The cow that is one-year-old is tawny-eyed and red. The above-mentioned case is analogus to this.[3]

[[1] Not substances.

[2] After the initial total comprehension.

[3] *Pū. Mī. Sū.* III. i. 12.]

तदेवमुद्देश्यगतविशेषणमविवक्षितम्, उपादेयगतं विवक्षितमिति स्थितम्। एवञ्च चित्रापदेन चित्रत्वस्त्रीत्वोभयविशेषितपशुकारकस्य यजेतेति पदानूदितेऽग्नीषोमीयपशुयागे विधातुं शक्यत्वात् कथं नामत्वमिति चेत्, न। यथा सति प्रकृतस्य प्राजापत्ययागस्य फलसम्बन्धाकांक्षस्य हानम्। अप्रकृतस्य अग्नीषोमीययागस्य कल्पना च स्यात्। तदुभयमयुक्तम्। तस्माच्चित्रापदं कर्मनामधेयम्। एवं तत्प्रख्यादिभिरन्यतमेन सर्वत्र कर्मनामत्वमूह्यम्॥ इत्थं विधिवाक्यस्य प्रामाण्यं विचारितम्।

Thus, then, it is established that the characteristics of the matter under reference are not sought to be conveyed, but those of what is utilised are. Hence, inasmuch as by the word 'Citrā'[1] a constituent, viz., an animal characterised by both variegatedness and femininity, can be enjoined for an animal sacrifice to the Fire and the Moon, restated by the words 'should sacrifice,' how can 'Citrā' be a name?

Reply: Not so; for in that case the sacrifice to Prajāpati, which is the topic under discussion, and which needs to be related to a result, would be abandoned, and a sacrifice to the Fire and the Moon, which is not the topic under discussion, would be conjured up. Both these are improper. Therefore the word 'Citrā' is the name of a rite. So, from any one of the grounds such as 'declaration of a particular thing,' we are to understand everywhere that a given word is the name of a rite. Thus the authoritativeness of a sentence inculcating an injunction has been discussed.

[1 In the sentence, "One who desires animals should sacrifice through the Citrā."]

CORROBORATIVE STATEMENTS

अथार्थवादो विचार्यते । अर्थवादानां तु स्वार्थपरत्वे प्रयोजनाभावादध्ययनविधिवशेन फलवदर्थज्ञानार्थत्वस्यावश्यकत्वात् विधेयगतप्राशस्त्यप्रतिपादनद्वारा विधिवाक्यैकवाक्यतया प्रामाण्यम् । स चतुर्विधः—निन्दा-प्रशंसा-परकृति-पुराकल्पभेदात् ।

तत्र निन्दाऽर्थवादो यथा "असत्रं वा एतद्यदच्छन्दोमम्," "अश्रुजं हि रजतं यो बर्हिषि ददाति पुराऽस्य संवत्सराद्गृहे रुदन्ति" इत्यादि ।

प्रशंसार्थवादो यथा "शोभतेऽस्य मुखं य एवं वेद," "वायुर्वै क्षेपिष्ठा देवता, वायुमेव स्वेन भागधेयेनोपधावति, स एवैनं भूतिं गमयति" इत्येवमादिः ।

Now corroborative statements (*arthavāda*) are being discussed. Since corroborative statements will be of no use[1] if their import be for its own sake, they must, on account of the injunction regarding study,[2] necessarily be for the purpose of imparting a knowledge of useful things; hence they are authoritative only as forming a unitary passage with sentences inculcating an injunction, by demonstrating the praiseworthiness of what is enjoined. They are of four kinds, being divided into condemnation, eulogy, heroic performance and past incident.

Of these, instances of condemnatory corroborative statement are passages like, "It is no sacrificial session (*satra*) that is devoid of the three syllabic numbers—twenty-four, forty-four and forty-eight"[3] (*Tai. S.* VII. III. vi. 2, etc.), and "He who bestows silver, which is produced from tears,[4] in the sacrifice called Barhis, has lamentation in his home before the lapse of a year" (*Tai. S.* I. v. i. 2).

Instances of eulogistic corroborative statement are passages like, "He who knows thus has a shining face" (*Tāṇ. Br.* XX. xvi. 6)[5] and "The Wind is indeed a very swift deity; if a person approaches (i.e., worships) him only with the special offering of the deity, the latter certainly makes him attain prosperity" (*Tai. S.* II. I. i. I).[6]

[[1] It will be of no good to anybody merely to know, for instance, that the Wind is a very swift deity; for this will not impel him either to do anything or to desist from any action.

[2] In the sentence, "One's own Vedas should be studied." The Vedas include the corroborative statements.

[3] Representing the Gāyatrī, Triṣṭubh and Jagatī metres respectively.

[4] The story is this: Once the gods went out to fight the demons, depositing their valuables with the deity Fire. Fire took a fancy to the treasures and fled with them. The victorious gods, on their return, saw his treachery, hunted him out and forced him to return their deposits. Fire thereupon fell to tears, and these became silver.

[5] The passage follows the injunction about a rite called Gargatrirātra.

[6] The quotation is preceded by the injunction, "One who desires prosperity should touch the white animal (a goat) relating to the deity Wind."]

परेण महता पुरुषेणेदं कर्म कृतमिति प्रतिपादकोऽर्थवादः परकृतिः। यथा "अग्निर्वा अकामयत" इत्यादिः।

परप्रवक्तृकार्थप्रतिपादकोऽर्थवादः पुराकल्पः । यथा "तमश-पद्धिया धिया त्वा वध्यासुः" इत्यादिः ।

Heroic performance[1] is that corroborative statement which demonstrates that a particular work was done by a great personage; for example, the passage, "Fire desired," etc.[2] (*Tai. Br.* III. I. iv. I).

Past incident is that corroborative statement which demonstrates something that has been narrated by another; for example, the passage, "He cursed it, saying, 'May people kill you whenever they have a mind to (or, by various devices)!'"[3] (*Tai. S.* II. VI. vi. I).

[[1] Authorities differ on the definitions of this and the next item. According to Kumārila Bhaṭṭa and others, both these are narrations of some past event, the former by one person and the latter by many persons.

[2] The passage reads thus: "Fire desired, 'Let me be a voracious eater among the gods.' He offered this cake baked on eight thin tiles to the deity Fire and the Pleiades. From that, verily, he became a voracious eater among the gods," etc. The commentator Sāyaṇa explains the first word 'Fire' as a man who in the next cycle became the deity Fire by performing the requisite rite.

[3] The deity Fire decided not to carry any more offerings to the gods, lest he, too, should die of exhaustion like his three elder brothers. He fled and hid himself in water. The gods started in search of him, and when they happened to come to that water, a fish betrayed the deity. Fire thereupon cursed the whole species that way. Then he agreed to resume his service to the gods on their acceptance of his term that whatever offerings fell outside the boundary of the sacred fire would go to his departed brothers. This explains the injunction, "One should put a boundary" (round the fire with three fagots), which follows the corroborative statement.]

तत्र निन्दाऽर्थवादस्य विधेयान्यनिन्दाद्वारा विधेयप्राशस्त्यपरत्वम्। “अश्रुजम्” इत्यादिरजतनिन्दाद्वारा विधेयभूतरजतदाननिषेधप्राशस्त्यपरत्वे विरोधाभावात्। इतरेषां त्रयाणां साक्षात् प्राशस्त्यपरत्वमेव। “वायुर्वै” इत्यर्थवादस्य वायुः क्षिप्रगामित्वादतीव प्रशस्ता देवता, अतस्तद्दैवत्यं कर्म प्रशस्तमिति विधेयदेवतागतप्राशस्त्यप्रतिपादनद्वारा विध्येकवाक्यत्वम्।

Of these, condemnatory corroborative statement devotes itself to praising the thing enjoined by condemning things other than that. Since the condemnation of silver in the passage, “He who bestows silver,” etc. is intended to praise what is enjoined, viz., not making a gift of silver, there is no contradiction. The other three are but directly eulogistic. The corroborative statement, “The Wind is indeed,” etc. suggests that the Wind, being swift in movement, is an exceedingly laudable deity, and therefore a rite with that as its deity is praiseworthy. It thus forms a unitary passage with the injunction by demonstrating the praiseworthiness of the deity that is enjoined.

“अग्निर्वा अकामयत” इत्यस्य अग्निदैवत्यो यागः पूर्वकाले अग्निना कृतत्वात् प्रशस्तः, आधिक्यादिदानीमप्यन्यैर्यजमानैरवश्यं कर्तव्य इति विधेयकर्मगतप्राशस्त्यद्वारा विध्येकवाक्यत्वम्। एवमन्यत्राप्यूह्यम्।

क्वचित् कार्यान्तरमप्यस्ति। यथा “अक्ताः शर्करा उपदधाति” इति विधौ “अक्ता” इति पदेन द्रवद्रव्यसामान्यं प्रतीयते। तच्च द्रव्यं किमिति सन्देहे “तेजो वै घृतम्” इत्यर्थवादाद्घृतमिति निश्चीयत इति “तेजो वै घृतम्” इत्यर्थवादस्य सन्दिग्धार्थनिर्णायकत्वेन प्रामाण्यम्।

The passage, “Fire desired,” etc. suggests that the sacrifice of which the deity is Fire was performed

in ancient times by Fire and is therefore praiseworthy, and because of its superiority should certainly be performed by other sacrificers even to-day. So it forms a unitary passage with the injunction through its praise of the rite that is enjoined. The same is to be understood in the other cases also.

Sometimes corroborative statements do other functions, too. For example, in the injunction, "One should spread soaked gravel (on the altar)," the word 'soaked' suggests a liquid substance in general. When a doubt arises as to what that substance may be, we conclude from the corroborative statement, "Ghee verily is light" (*Tai*. S. II. ii. ix. 4), that it is ghee. So this corroborative statement is authoritative as deciding a doubtful meaning as well.

SACRED TEXTS

अथ मन्त्रविचारः। मन्त्राणामपि अध्ययनविधिना कृत्स्नस्वाध्यायस्य फलवदर्थज्ञानार्थत्वमेव, न त्वदृष्टार्थत्वम्। दृष्टे सम्भवत्यदृष्टकल्पनाऽयोगात्। प्रयोगकाले कर्मज्ञानं विना कर्मानुष्ठानायोगात् कर्मौपयिकमर्थज्ञानं मन्त्रैः क्रियते।

न चोपदेष्टृवचनादिनाऽप्यर्थस्मरणसम्भवादनुष्ठानोपपत्तिरिति वाच्यम्। मन्त्रैरेवार्थं स्मृत्वाऽनुष्ठाने सति फलं भवति नान्यथेति नियमाङ्गीकारात्। नियमेनादृष्टस्याङ्गीकारात् तदभावे तज्जन्यादृष्टलोपे तन्मूलं फलं न सिध्यतीति कल्पनात्।

Now sacred texts[1] (*mantras*) are being discussed. They, too, on account of the injunction about study of one's own Vedas in their entirety, are solely for imparting a knowledge of useful things, and not for any invisible purpose; for where a visible result is possible, it is improper to assume an invisible one. Since performance of rites is impossible without a knowledge of them at the time of performance, sacred texts furnish a knowledge of things that are helpful to the performance of (those) rites.

It cannot be urged that performance can take place inasmuch as recollection of those things is also possible through the utterance of the instructor etc.; for the restriction is admitted that results will accrue only if the performance takes place after recollection of the things concerned through sacred texts, and not otherwise. And it being held that the restriction leads to the unique result, it is assumed that in its absence the unique result due to it will be missing, and hence the ultimate result accruing therefrom will not follow.

नन्वेवं मन्त्राणां स्वप्रकाश्येऽर्थे विनियोग इति फलितम्। विनियोगो नाम शेषत्वेनान्वयः। शेषत्वं नाम अङ्गत्वम्। ततश्च "इमामगृभ्णन् रशनाम्" इति मन्त्रस्य रशनाग्रहणप्रकाशनसामर्थ्यमस्तीति रशनाग्रहणप्रकाशनसामर्थ्यरूपात् लिङ्गादेव रशनाग्रहणाङ्गत्वोपपत्तेः "इमामगृभ्णन् रशनामृतस्य इत्यश्वाभिधानीमादत्ते" इति वचनं किमर्थमिति चेत्, न; परिसंख्यार्थत्वात्। चयनप्रकरणेऽश्वरशनाग्रहणं गर्दभरशनाग्रहणं चेति द्वयमस्ति। तत्र लिङ्गादश्वरशनायां मन्त्रप्राप्तावुच्यमानायां लिङ्गाविशेषाद्गर्दभरशनायामपि मन्त्रः प्राप्तः, अतो अश्वरशनायामेव मन्त्रः कार्यः, न गर्दभरशनायामिति मन्त्रनिवृत्तिरूपपरिसंख्याऽर्थोऽयं विधिः।

Objection: So it is evident that sacred texts are applicable to the things expressed by them. And application is being related as an accessory, which means a subsidiary. Therefore, inasmuch as the

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[[1] As opposed to sacred commentaries (*brāhmaṇas*). See p. 2.]

sacred text, "They seized this rein," etc. (*Tai. S.* V. I. ii. I), has the power of expressing the seizing of the rein, it is clear from the very indication (*liṅga*), viz., the power of expressing the seizing of the rein, that the sacred text is a subsidiary to the seizing of the rein; so what is the use of (the additional clause in) the sentence, "One should catch hold of the rein of the horse, saying, 'They seized the rein of (the horse, which is a means to) the sacrifice' " (*Ibid.*)?

Reply: Not so; for it is for the purpose of exclusion. Under the topic of brick-laying,[1] there are two (acts), viz., seizing the rein of the horse and seizing that of the donkey. Now, if it be said that from the indication the sacred text is applicable to the rein of the horse, then, the indication being the same, the sacred text may also apply to the rein of the donkey. Hence this injunction is for the purpose of exclusion, viz., withholding of the sacred text (from one of the two items), meaning that it is to be recited in respect of (seizing) the rein of the horse only, and not that of the donkey.

[1] See note I on p. 22.

सा च परिसंख्या त्रिदोषा—स्वार्थत्यागः, परार्थस्वीकारः, प्राप्तबाधश्चेति। तत्र "अश्वाभिधानीमादत्ते" इति वाक्यस्य अनेन मन्त्रेणाश्वरशनाऽऽदानं कुर्यादिति स्वार्थः, स च त्यक्तः। गर्दभरशनातो मन्त्रनिवृत्तिः परार्थः, स च स्वीकृतः। गर्दभरशनायामपि लिङ्गात् प्राप्तस्य मन्त्रस्य अनेन बाधश्च इति त्रिदोषा परिसंख्या गत्यभावादङ्गीकृता। गत्यन्तरे सति सा न युक्ता।

That exclusion has three defects, viz., abandonment of the primary meanihg, acceptance of a strange meaning and annulment of the *prima facie* view. Now, the primary meaning of the sentence, "One should seize the rein of the horse," is that one should catch hold of the rein of the horse, uttering this sacred text; that is abandoned. The withholding of the sacred text from (the seizing of) the rein of the donkey is a strange meaning; that is accepted. And the sacred text (minus this clause) applies *prima facie*, from the indication, to (the seizing of) the rein of the donkey also; this is annulled by this clause. Thus exclusion, which has these three defects, is admitted, since there is no alternative. It would not be admissible if there were any alternative.

एवमष्टदोषदुष्टविकल्पोऽप्यगतिकोऽङ्गीकृतः। यथा, आग्नेयोऽष्टाकपालः संस्कृतः पुरोडाशो यागाङ्गत्वेनावगतः। तत्र अपूपविशेषस्य पुरोडाशस्य प्रकृतिद्रव्याकांक्षायाम् अनियमेन यस्य कस्यचिद्द्रव्यस्य प्राप्तौ "व्रीहिभिर्यजेत" इति वाक्यात् व्रीहयो नियम्यन्ते। एवं "यवैर्यजेत" इति वाक्याद्यवा अपि नियम्यन्ते। तयोरेकार्थत्वाद्विकल्पः।

एवम् "अतिरात्रे षोडशिनं गृह्णाति" इत्यतिरात्रे षोडशिग्रहणं विहितम्। तथा "नातिरात्रे षोडशिनं गृह्णाति" इति प्रतिषेधात् ग्रहणाभावो विहितः। तयोर्ग्रहणाग्रहणयोः परस्परविरुद्धयोरेकस्मिन् प्रयोगेऽनुष्ठातुमशक्यत्वात् क्वचित् प्रयोगे ग्रहणानुष्ठानम्, प्रयोगान्तरे तदभावानुष्ठानमिति तत्रापि विकल्पः।

Similarly, option (*vikalpa*), which is vitiated by eight defects, is also admitted, there being no alternative. For example, the consecrated cake (*puroḍāśa*) relating to the Fire, baked on eight thin tiles (p. 12), is known to be a subsidiary to a sacrifice. Now, with regard to the *puroḍāśa*, which is a kind of cake, one may ask what is its constituent material; and any material without restriction may be put forward as a *prima facie* view. The sentence, "One should sacrifice with rice grains," however, restricts it to rice grains only. Similarly, the sentence, "One should sacrifice with barley grains," restricts it to barley grains also. Since both serve the same purpose, there is an option between them.

Likewise, the sentence, "One should use the cup *ṣoḍaśin* in the Atirātra sacrifice," enjoins the cup named *ṣoḍaśin* in the Atirātra sacrifice. Again, from the negation, "One should not use the cup *ṣoḍaśin* in the Atirātra sacrifice," its non-use is enjoined. Since use and non-use, which are contradictory to each other, cannot both be resorted to in the same performance, therefore in some performance the cup is used, while in some other it is omitted. Thus here also there is an option.

स चाष्टदोषदुष्टः। तथाहि—पूर्वं व्रीहिप्रयोगे यवशास्त्रस्य स्वार्थानुष्ठापकत्वलक्षणप्रामाण्यपरित्यागः, अननुष्ठापकत्वलक्षणाप्रामाण्यस्वीकारः। ततो द्वितीयप्रयोगे यवानुष्ठाने यवशास्त्रस्य पूर्वं त्यक्तं यत् प्रामाण्यं तत्स्वीकारः, स्वीकृतं यदप्रामाण्यं तत्परित्यागश्चेति यवशास्त्रे चत्वारो दोषाः। एवं पूर्वं यवप्रयोगे व्रीहिशास्त्रस्य स्वार्थानुष्ठापकत्वलक्षणं यत्प्रामाण्यं तत्परित्यागः, अननुष्ठापकत्वलक्षणं यदप्रामाण्यं तत्स्वीकारः। पुनर्द्वितीयप्रयोगे व्रीह्यनुष्ठाने व्रीहिशास्त्रस्य त्यक्तप्रामाण्यस्वीकारः, स्वीकृताप्रामाण्यपरित्यागश्चेति व्रीहिशास्त्रे चत्वारो दोषाः, इत्यष्टदोषदुष्टो विकल्पः।

And this option is vitiated by eight defects. For example, if the performance is first with rice grains, then the authority of the text prescribing barley, consisting in an inducement to utilise its primary meaning, is abandoned, and its unauthoritativeness, in the form of a lack of inducement to utilise that meaning, is admitted. Next, if in the second performance barley is used, then that authority of the text prescribing barley which was first abandoned is admitted, and its unauthoritativeness that was admitted is discarded. So the text prescribing barley is subject to four defects. Similarly, if barley is first used, that authority of the text prescribing rice grains which consists in an inducement to utilise its primary meaning, is abandoned, and that unauthoritativeness of the text which takes the form of a lack of inducement to utilise that meaning, is admitted. Again, if in the second performance rice grains are used, then the abandoned authority of the text prescribing rice grains is admitted, and its admitted unauthoritativeness is discarded. So the text prescribing rice grains is subject to four defects. Thus an option is vitiated by eight defects.

स च विकल्पः क्वचिदेकार्थत्वात्, एककार्यकारित्वादित्यर्थः। यथा व्रीहियवयोरेकैकस्य पुरोडाशनिष्पादनक्षमत्वाद्विकल्पः। क्वचित् वचनबलात्। यथा. "बृहत्पृष्ठं भवति" इति बृहत्सामसाध्यं पृष्ठनामकं स्तोत्रं विहितम्; "रथन्तरं पृष्ठं भवति" इति रथन्तरसामसाध्यं पृष्ठस्तोत्रान्तरं विधीयते।

This option is sometimes due to things having a common purpose, that is, doing the same function. For example, there is an option between rice and barley, since each of them can produce the cake. Sometimes it is due to a scriptural statement. For example, in the sentence, "The *pṛṣṭha* should consist of the *bṛhat*" (*Tai. Br.* I. II. ii. 4), a hymn called *pṛṣṭha,* which is made up of verses called *bṛhat-sāman,* is enjoined; while in the sentence, "The *pṛṣṭha* should consist of the *rathantara*" (*Śat. Br.* V. IV. V. 7), another hymn called *pṛṣṭha*, made up of verses called *rathantara-sāman*, is enjoined.

स्तोत्रं च प्रयाजादिवदपूर्वार्थत्वादर्थकर्म। साम तु संस्कारकर्मत्वाद्गुणकर्म। स्तोत्रसाधनीभूतस्तोत्रियाक्षराभिव्यक्तिरूपसंस्कारद्वारा साम्नां स्तोत्रसाधनत्वाङ्गीकारात्। प्रगीतमन्त्रसाध्यमिन्द्रादिगुणिनिष्ठगुणाभिधानं स्तोत्रम्। प्रगीतमन्त्रसाध्यं सामाभिव्यक्तऋगक्षरसाध्यमित्यर्थः। अप्रगीतमन्त्रसाध्यगुणिनिष्ठगुणाभिधानं शस्त्रम्। गानक्रियाविशेषः साम। स्तोत्रसाधनीभूता ऋचः स्तोत्रियाः। तद्गतत्रिवृत्पञ्चदशत्वादिसंख्याविशेषः स्तोमः इत्येतेषां भेदः। तथाच बृहद्रथन्तरपृष्ठयोः भिन्नापूर्वार्थत्वेन एकार्थत्वाभावेऽपि "बृहद्वा पृष्ठं कार्यम्," "रथन्तरं वा पृष्ठं कार्यम्," इति वचनबलादेव विकल्पः।

A hymn (*stotra*) is a principal rite, since it is for the purpose of producing the unique result, like the Prayāja etc. The *sāman*, however, is a subsidiary rite, since it is a purificatory rite; for *sāmans* are admitted as means to hymns through the purification they produce in the form of disjoined articulation of the syllables of the *ṛces* called *stotriyās*, which are means to the hymn. A hymn is the recital of attributes abiding in a possessor of them, such as Indra, which is produced by sacred texts that are sung. The last clause means: which is produced by the *ṛc* syllables manifested by the *sāman*. A *śastra* is the recital of attributes abiding in their possessor, which is produced by sacred texts that are not sung. The *sāman* is a mode of singing. A *ṛc* that serves as a means to a hymn is designated as *stotriyā*. And *stoma* is a particular number such as nine or fifteen with regard to the *stotriyās*. These are the differences among them.

So, although the *pṛṣṭha* hymns called *bṛhat* and *rathantara* are meant to produce different unique results, and as such do not serve an identical purpose, yet there is an option between them solely on the strength of the scriptural statement, "The *pṛṣṭha* should either be composed of the *bṛhat* or it should be composed of the *rathantara*."

क्वचित् व्यवस्थितविकल्पः। यथा द्वितीयप्रयाजकर्मणि नराशंसतनूनपान्मन्त्रयोः एकार्थत्वाद्विकल्पः। स च "राजन्यवासिष्ठादीनां नाराशंसो द्वितीयः प्रयाजस्तनूनपादन्येषाम्" इति वाक्याद्व्यवस्थित इति व्यवस्थितविकल्पः।

तदेवं चोदनापरपर्यायाणां विधिवाक्यानाम् अंशत्रयविशिष्टभावनाविधायकत्वात् प्रामाण्यम्; उद्भिदादीनां नामतया, अर्थवादानां विधेयप्राशस्त्यपरतया, मन्त्राणामनुष्ठेयार्थस्मारकतया प्रामाण्यमिति कृत्स्नस्य वेदस्यालौकिके धर्माधर्माख्येऽर्थे प्रामाण्यं स्थितम्।

Sometimes there is an option according to specification. For instance, in the second Prayāja sacrifice, since the sacred texts relating to the deities Narāśaṁsa and Tanūnapāt have an identical purpose, there is an option between them; and because of the sentence, "For kings and for the descendants of Vaśiṣṭha, etc. the second Prayāja is to be performed with the sacred texts relating to the deity Narāśaṁsa, while for others it is to be performed with the sacred texts relating to the deity Tanūnapāt," it is a case of an option according to specification.

Therefore, in the foregoing manner, sentences inculcating an injunction (*vidhi*), which is another name for direction (*codanā*), are authoritative, inasmuch as they enjoin an urge with three parts[1]; words such as 'Udbhid' are so on account of being names; corroborative statements are authoritative as setting forth the praiseworthiness of what is enjoined; and sacred texts are so as calling to mind things that are to be performed. Hence the authority of the entire Vedas with regard to transcendental matters called righteous and unrighteous actions is obvious.

[[1] See pp. 47 *et seq.*]

मन्वादिप्रणीतानां स्मृतीनामपि वेदमूलकत्वात्स्यादष्टकादौ धर्मे प्रामाण्यम्। "औदुम्बरी सर्वा वेष्टयितव्या" इति स्मृतिरप्रमाणम्, "औदुम्बरीं स्पृष्ट्वोद्गायेत्" इति प्रत्यक्षश्रुतिविरुद्धत्वात्। सर्ववेष्टने सति श्रुत्युक्तस्पर्शनस्य कर्तुमशक्यत्वात्। "वैसर्जनहोमीयं वासोऽध्वर्युर्गृह्णाति" इत्यादि स्मृतिरप्रमाणम्, श्रुत्यर्थाविरुद्धत्वेऽपि लोभमूलकत्वात्।

The Smṛtis composed by Manu and others also possess authority with regard to righteous ceremonies such as the Aṣṭakā,[1] since they are based on the Vedas. The Smṛti text, "The entire (post made of the) fig branch is to be covered," is, however, not authoritative, inasmuch as it contradicts the manifest Śruti text, "One should chant (the Udgītha) touching the sacrificial post made of the fig tree"; for if the entire post be covered, the touching mentioned in the Sruti would be impossible. Smṛti passages such as, "The cloth relating to the valedictory *homa* should be received by the *adhvaryu*,[2]" are unauthoritative, because, although not contradictory to the import of the Śruti, they spring from greed.

[[1] A ceremony in honour of the departed.

[2] See note 1 on p. 27.]

तथा शिष्टाचारोऽपि स्मृतिद्वारा श्रुतिमूलकत्वात् प्रमाणम्।

मातुलसुतापरिणयनादिशिष्टाचारस्त्वप्रमाणम्। "मातुलस्य सुतामूढ्वा" इत्यादि स्मृत्या निषिद्धत्वेन स्मृतिविरुद्धत्वात्।

तदेवं श्रुतिस्मृत्याचाराणां धर्माधर्मयोः प्रामाण्यमुक्तम्।

Similarly, usage among the cultured is authoritative, since it is based on the Śruti through the Smṛti. Such usage among the cultured as marrying a maternal uncle's daughter, however, is unauthoritative, because this is forbidden by the Smṛti text, "Marrying a maternal uncle's daughter," etc.,[1] and therefore contradicts the Smṛti.

Thus the authority of the Śruti, Smṛti and (approved) usage in the determination of righteous or unrighteous action has been described.

[[1] The concluding part of the verse lays down an expiation, viz., *cāndrāyaṇa*, for the offence.]

CRITERIA OF A DIFFERENCE OF RITE

स च धर्मः परस्परं भिन्नः। भेदकप्रमाणानि तु शब्दान्तरादीनि।

तथाहि—यागदानहोमानां यजति-ददाति-जुहोत्यपर्यायशब्दप्रतिपाद्यत्वाच्छब्दान्तराद्भेदः। स्वस्वत्वनिवृत्तिपूर्वकं परस्वत्वापादानं दानम्।

"समिधो यजति" इत्यादीनां पञ्चानां वाक्यानां मध्ये एकस्य कर्मविधायकत्वमन्येषां तस्मिन् कर्मणि गुणविधायकत्वमित्यत्र नियामकाभावात्सर्वेषां कर्मविधायकत्वे स्थिते विहितस्य कर्मणः पुनर्विधानं व्यर्थमिति पुनर्विधानसामर्थ्यात् पूर्ववाक्यविहितकर्मापेक्षया उत्तरोत्तरवाक्यविहितस्य कर्मणो भेदः सिध्यतीत्येतादृशस्थलेष्वविशेषपुनःश्रुतिरूपाद्यजतिपदाभ्यासात् कर्मभेदः।

Such righteous acts are different from one another, the evidences of difference being a different word and so on.[1]

To be explicit: A sacrifice, a gift and an offering (*homa*) are different from one another on account of different words (denoting them), since they are expressed by the verbs 'to sacrifice,' 'to give' and 'to offer,' which are not synonymous. A gift is the termination of one's own right and the establishment of another's right (to a thing).

Of the five sentences beginning with, "One should perform the Samidh sacrifice" (*Tai. S.* II. vi. i. 1), since there is nothing to determine that only one of them enjoins a rite and the others accessories to that rite, it is clear that all of them enjoin rites; and since it is futile to re-enjoin a rite already enjoined, the very fact of their being re-enjoined establishes the difference of each succeeding rite from the preceding one. Hence, in such cases, the repetition of the identical term 'should sacrifice' in the Śruti proves, on the ground of repetition, that the rites are different.

"तिस्र आहुतीर्जुहोति" इत्यत्र जुहोतिपदाभ्यासाभावेऽपि जुहोतीत्यर्थे होमे त्रित्वसंख्यान्वयात्परस्परं भिन्नास्त्रयो होमा इति संख्ययाऽत्र कर्मभेदः।

"अथैष ज्योतिरथैष विश्वज्योतिरथैष सर्वज्योतिरेतेन सहस्रदक्षिणेन यजेत" इति ज्योतिष्टोमप्रकरणे श्रुतानामपि ज्योतिराद्याख्यानां त्रयाणां यागानां ज्योतिष्टोमसंज्ञापेक्षया पृथक् संज्ञात्रयकरणात् ज्योतिष्टोमापेक्षया भेदः। भिन्नसंज्ञावशादेव त्रयाणां परस्परं भेद इति संज्ञया कर्मभेदः।

In the sentence, "One should offer three oblations" (*Tai. S.* II. iii. ix. 3; *Tai. Br.* I. iii. x. 3 etc.;

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[1] That is, repetition, number, name, accessory and a different context.]

Sat. Br. IX. II. i. 2 etc.), although there is no repetition of the term 'should offer,' the number 'three' comes into relation with *homa,* which is the meaning of the verb 'to offer,' and this proves that these three *homas* are mutually different. Hence here there is a difference of rite on account of number.

Although three sacrifices called Jyotis etc. are mentioned under the topic of Jyotiṣṭoma in the passage, "Now this is Jyotis (light); now this is Viśva-jyotis (universal light); now this is Sarva-jyotis (all-light); one should sacrifice through this, with a thousand (cows) as remuneration for the priests," they are different from the Jyotiṣṭoma sacrifice, inasmuch as three names different from 'Jyotistoma' have been given to them. Since the three (sacrifices) are mutually different solely on account of different names, this is a case of difference of rite because of names.

तथा "तप्ते पयसि दध्यानयति, सा वैश्वदेव्यामिक्षा, वाजिभ्यो वाजिनम्" इत्यत्र "सा वैश्वदेवी" इति वाक्ये विश्वदेवदेवताऽऽमिक्षाद्रव्यसम्बन्धानुमितो यागो विधीयते। "वाजिभ्यो वाजिनम्" इत्यत्रापि वाजिदैवत्य-वाजिनद्रव्यक-कर्मान्तरं विधीयते। न तु पूर्वविहिते वैश्वदेवयागे वाजिनद्रव्यरूपो गुणो विधीयते, पूर्वयागस्याऽऽमिक्षागुणावरुद्धत्वेन तत्र वाजिनस्य निवेशायोगात्। न च व्रीहियववद्विकल्पः; वाजिनामिक्षयोः समशिष्टत्वाभावात्, विषमशिष्टयोर्विकल्पायोगात्। वैश्वदेवयागोत्पत्तिवाक्ये एवामिक्षागुणः शिष्यत इत्युत्पत्तिशिष्टः। शिष्यते विधीयत इत्यर्थः। वैश्वदेववाक्यादुत्पन्ने कर्मणि वाक्यान्तरेण शिष्टो विहितो वाजिनगुण उत्पन्नशिष्टः। तयोर्मध्ये ह्युत्पत्तिशिष्टः प्रबलः, कर्मोत्पत्तिवेलायामेव कर्माङ्गत्वेन प्रमितत्वात्। उत्पन्नशिष्टो वाजिनगुणोऽनन्तरं प्रमितोऽपि विलम्बितत्वेन दुर्बलत्वात् तत्पूर्वकर्मणि निवेशमलभमानो वाजिरूपदेवता-

न्तरसम्बन्धात् स्ववाक्यस्य कर्मान्तरविधायकत्वमानयतीति गुणा-
भेदः । तत्र घनीभूतं पय आमिक्षा, शिष्टं जलं वाजिनम् ।

Similiarly, in the sentence, "One should add curd to hot milk; that fresh cheese belongs to the Viśvadevas, and the whey is for the Vājins" (*Mai. S.* I. x. 1), in the clause, "That fresh cheese belongs to the Viśvadevas," a sacrifice, inferable from its relation to the deities, viz., Viśvadevas, and the material, viz., fresh cheese, is enjoined. In the clause, "And the whey is for the Vājins," also, another rite, of which the deity is Vājin and the material whey, is enjoined. It is not that an accessory, viz., the material whey, is enjoined in the sacrifice to the Viśvadevas, already enjoined; for the previous sacrifice being confined to the accessory fresh cheese, there is no scope for the whey to be introduced (as an accessory). Nor is here an option as between rice grains and barley; for the whey and the fresh cheese are not prescribed with the same status, and between things that are prescribed with a different status, there can be no option. The accessory fresh cheese is enjoined only in the sentence originating the sacrifice to the Viśvadevas; so it is something prescribed in connection with origination. 'Prescribed,' that is, enjoined. The accessory whey is prescribed—that is, enjoined—by another sentence in a rite originated by the sentence relating to the Viśvadevas; so it is something prescribed in connection with what has been originated. And between the two, the one that is prescribed in connection with origination is stronger, for it is cognised as a subsidiary to the rite at the very time that the rite is originated. But the accessory whey, prescribed in connection with what has been originated, although it is cognised immediately after, is weaker on account of its appearing later, and for that reason does not find a place in the previous rite. So, on account of its relation to another deity, viz., Vājin, it converts the sentence in which it occurs into an injunction regarding another rite. Hence here is difference owing to an accessory. In the text quoted, the fresh cheese (*āmikṣā*) is coagulated milk, and the whey (*vājina*) is the water that is left.

तथा कुण्डपायिनामयने श्रूयते—“उपसद्भिश्चरित्वा मासमग्निहोत्रं जुहोति” इति। अत्र पूर्वं कर्म किञ्चिदपि सन्निहितं न भवति; अपूर्वकर्मसन्निधानरूपात् प्रकरणान्तरात् प्रसिद्धाग्निहोत्रधर्मकं तन्नामकं कर्मान्तरं विधीयते। न त्वग्निहोत्रशब्देन प्रसिद्धाग्निहोत्रमनूद्य गुणविधिः। प्राप्ते कर्मणि आनन्तर्य-मासरूपानेकगुणविधौ वाक्यभेदापत्तेरिति प्रकरणान्तरादत्र कर्मभेदः। प्रसिद्धाग्निहोत्रं नैयमिकाग्निहोत्रम्, नित्याग्निहोत्रमिति यावत्।

तदेवं शब्दान्तराभ्यास-संख्या-संज्ञा-गुण-प्रकरणान्तरैः कर्मभेदो दर्शितः।

Similarly, it is stated in connection with the sacrifice called 'the way of the *kuṇḍapāyins,*' "After going through the ceremonies called Upasads, one should offer the Agnihotra for a month." Here no previously known rite whatsoever is present before the mind; owing (rather) to the cognition of an original rite—which means a different context—a different rite possessing the characteristics of the well-known Agnihotra and bearing its name is enjoined. It is not an injunction regarding an accessory to the well-known Agnihotra, restated by the word 'Agnihotra.' For, if with regard to a rite already known, more accessories than one, viz., sequence and (the duration of) a month, are enjoined, it would create a split of the sentence.

Hence here is a difference of rite on account of a different context. The expression 'well-known Agnihotra' means the compulsory[1] Agnihotra, that is to say, the daily Agnihotra.

Thus, then, a difference of rite has been demonstrated on account of different words, repetition, number, name, accessories and a different context.

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[1] As opposed to the optional Agnihotra.

THREEFOLD VEDIC SUBJECT-MATTER

अथ प्रमेयादिविचारः। तत्र वेदादिप्रमेयोऽर्थस्त्रिविधः—क्रत्वर्थः, पुरुषार्थः, उभयार्थश्चेति। तत्र प्रयाजादिकं केवलं क्रत्वर्थः, फलं तत्करणं च पुरुषार्थः, यथा स्वर्गादिर्ज्योतिष्टोमादिश्च। दध्यादि तूभयरुपम्, "दध्ना जुहुयात्" इति फलासंयुक्तवाक्येन क्रत्वर्थत्वात्, "दध्नेन्द्रियकामस्य जुहुयात्" इत्यनेन फलाय विधानात् पुरुषार्थत्वात्। तदुक्तम्—"एकस्य तूभयत्वे संयोगपृथक्त्वम्" इति। संयोगो वाक्यम्, तस्य पृथक्त्वं भेदः, स एकस्य उभयार्थत्वे नियामक इत्यर्थः।

Now let us discuss things to be known and so on. Things to be known from the Vedas etc. are threefold: those contributing to the sacrifice, those contributing to human needs, and those doing both. Of these, the Prayāja etc. contribute only to the sacrifice. The result and its means contribute to human needs; as, for example, heaven etc. and Jyotiṣṭoma etc. Curd etc. on the other hand do both; for, on account of not mentioning results, such as, "One should perform *homa* with curd," it contributes to the sacrifice, while on account of its being enjoined for the sake of results by the sentence, "For a person desiring (vigorous) organs (the priest) should perform *homa* with curd" (*Tai. Br.* II. I. v. 5, adapted), it contributes to human needs. So it has been stated, "But as regards the same sentence having both characteristics, a difference of sentences (is the deciding factor)" (*Pū. Mī. Sū*. IV. iii. 5). 'Saṁyoga' (in the original) means a sentence; its 'difference' or separateness is the deciding factor in respect of the same sentence having both characteristics—this is the sense.

क्रत्वर्थे प्रयाजादौ क्रतुः प्रयोजकः, पुरुषार्थे फलं प्रयोजकम्। प्रयोजकत्वं नामानुष्ठापकत्वमित्यर्थः। विधिर्यदर्थं यदनुष्ठापयति स तत्र प्रयोजकः। दर्शादिविधिः स्वर्गाद्यर्थं दर्शादिकमनुष्ठापयतीति स्वर्गादिर्दर्शादौ प्रयोजकः। प्रयाजादिविधिः प्रयाजादीन् दर्शाद्यर्थम् अनुष्ठापयतीति दर्शादिः प्रयाजानां प्रयोजकः। दध्यानयनविधिः दध्यानयनमामिक्षार्थमनुष्ठापयति, न वाजिनार्थम्; आमिक्षार्थं दध्यानयनानुष्ठाने सति वाजिनस्य स्वतः सिद्धत्वात्। अत आमिक्षैव दध्यानयने प्रयोजिका, न वाजिनम्। "पुरोडाशकपालेन तुषानुपवपति" इति तुषोपवापाङ्गत्वेन पुरोडाशकपालं विधीयते; तथापि तुषोपवापः कपालस्य प्रयोजको न भवति, पुरोडाशार्थमुपात्तेनैव कपालेन तुषोपवापसिद्धेः, किन्तु पुरोडाश एव कपालस्य प्रयोजक इत्याद्यूह्यम्॥

With regard to what contributes to the sacrifice, for example, the Prayāja, the sacrifice is the incentive (*prayojaka*), while with regard to what contributes to human needs, the result is the incentive. By an incentive is meant that which leads to its performance. That for the sake of which an injunction causes something to be done, is an incentive with regard to that. The injunction about the new-moon sacrifice etc. causes these to be performed for the sake of heaven etc.; hence the latter are the incentives to the new-moon sacrifice etc. The injunction regarding the Prayāja etc. causes them to be performed for the sake of the new-moon sacrifice etc.; hence the latter are the incentives to the Prayāja etc. The injunction about the adding of the curd causes this to be done for the sake of the fresh cheese, not for the whey; for the adding of the curd being done for the sake of the fresh cheese, the whey is automatically produced. Hence it is the fresh cheese, and not the whey, that is the incentive to the adding of the curd. In the sentence, "One should separate the husks with the thin tile used for the cake," the tile is enjoined as a subsidiary to the separation of the husks. Yet this separation is not the incentive to the tile, for the separation of the husks is achieved through the very tile that is used for the sake of the cake; but it is the cake that is the incentive to the tile. And so on.

ORDER

अथ क्रमनिरूपणम्। ननु विधिना साङ्गं प्रधानं कर्तव्यतया चोद्यते। तत्राङ्गानां प्रधानानां च कर्मणां बहुत्वात् क्रमेणानुष्ठानं वाच्यम्। तत्क्रमनियामकं प्रमाणं किमिति चेत्, न; श्रुत्यादीनामेव क्रमनियामकत्वात्।

तथाहि—"अध्वर्युर्गृहपतिं दीक्षयित्वा ब्रह्माणं दीक्षयति" इत्यत्र क्त्वाश्रुत्या गृहपतिदीक्षानन्तरं ब्रह्मदीक्षेति श्रौतक्रमः।

Now order is being ascertained.

Objection: An injunction prescribes a principal rite together with its subsidiaries as the thing to be done. Now, since the principal and subsidiary rites are many, we must say that they are to be performed one after the other, and what can be the criterion that regulates this order?

Reply: Not so, for direct assertion etc.[1] regulate the order.

To explain: In the sentence, "The priest called *adhvaryu*,[2] having initiated the master of the house,[3] should initiate the superintending priest," the direct assertion, viz., the participial suffix *ktvā* (in the original), shows that the initiation of the superintending priest follows that of the master of the house. So here is order according to direct assertion.

[[1] The criteria are as follows: direct assertion, purpose, reading, position, principal rite and procedure. They are in a descending order of importance.

[2] See note 1 on p. 27.

[3] In a sacrificial session (*satra*) there are seventeen sacrificers, instead of the usual one. Sixteen of them serve as priests, and the remaining one stands for the sacrificer, who is here referred to as the master of the house.]

"समिधो यजति," "तनूनपातं यजति" इत्यादौ विधिवाक्यपाठक्रमादेव समिदादियागानुष्ठानक्रमः ।

"अग्निहोत्रं जुहोति, यवागूं पचति" इत्यत्र यवागूपाकस्य होमार्थत्वेन पाकात् पूर्वं होमस्य कर्तुमशक्यत्वात् पाठक्रमं त्यक्त्वाऽर्थक्रमः स्वीकर्तव्यः। अर्थः प्रयोजनं होमादिरूपम्, तदधीनः क्रमः अर्थक्रमः । तेन पूर्वं पाकः, पश्चाद्धोमः ।

In passages like, "One should perform the Samidh" sacrifice (*Tai. S.* II. VI. i. I.), and "One should perform the Tanūnapāt sacrifice" (*Ibid*.), the order of performance of the sacrifices Samidh etc. should be just according to the order of reading of the sentences inculcating the injunctions.

In the (consecutive) sentences, "One should offer the Agnihotra" (*Tai. Br.* II. I. v. 6), and "One should cook rice gruel" (*Ibid.*), since the cooking of the barley is for the purpose of *homa*, it is impossible to perform the *homa* before the cooking. Hence, giving up the order according to reading, that according to purpose (*artha-krama*) is to be adopted. *'Artha'* is purpose, such as *homa;* order depending on that is *artha-krama*. Therefore, first there should be cooking and then *homa*.

तथा "सप्तदश प्राजापत्यान् पशूनालभेत" इत्यत्र सप्तदशपशुद्रव्यक-प्रजापतिदेवताकाः सप्तदश यागाः कर्तव्यत्वेन बोधिताः। तत्रोपाकरणाख्य आद्यः पदार्थः यतः कुतश्चिदारभ्य यत्र क्वचित् समापनीयः। नियोजनादिकं तु येन क्रमेण उपाकरणं प्रवृत्तं तेनैव क्रमेण कर्तव्यम्। कथम्? प्रकृतावग्नीषोमीयपशोरेकत्वेन उपाकरणमादौ कृत्वा द्वितीयक्षणे एव नियोजनं तृतीयक्षणे एव प्रोक्षणम्, व्यवधानप्रयोजकाभावात्। अत्र तु सप्तदशपशूनां सहानुष्ठेयत्ववचनात् प्रथमतो यत्र क्वचित् पशौ कृतमुपाकरणं स्वाश्रयकर्तव्यनियोजनाय षोडशभिः क्षणैर्व्यवधानं सहते, न त्वधिकम्। तत्रोपाकरणक्रमेण नियोजनं प्रथमपशावकृत्वा पश्वन्तरे नियोजनं कृत्वाऽनन्तरं प्रथमपशौ नियोजनकरणे षोडशक्षणाधिकक्षणव्यवधानं शास्त्राननुमतमापद्येत। तन्निरासायोपाकरणं येन क्रमेण प्रवृत्तं तेनैव नियोजनादिकं कार्यमिति प्रवृत्तिक्रमः।

Similarly, in the sentence, "One should kill seventeen animals relating to Prajāpati" (*Śat. Br.* XI. v. vi. 3; *Tai. Br.* I. III. iv. 3), seventeen sacrifices, of which as many animals constitute the material and Prajāpati the deity, are enjoined as the thing to be done. Now, the first item, called touching, may begin with any animal and end with any (other) animal. Tying and other items, however, are to be done exactly in the order in which the touching proceeded. How? In the typical sacrifice (called Daikṣa), since the animal relating to the Fire and the Moon is one, first touching is done, then in the very next moment tying, and in the third moment itself sprinkling; for there is nothing to determine the imposition of any interval (among them). Here (in the Vājapeya sacrifice), however, on account of the text inculcating simultaneous use of the seventeen animals, the touching, first done with any of the animals, stands an interval of sixteen seconds—but no more—for the tying to be done in respect of the animal that received the touch. If, however, tying is not done, in the order of touching, in respect of the first animal, and some other animal is first tied and then the first animal, it would cause an interval of more than sixteen seconds, which is not supported by the scripture. To avoid that, the tying etc. should be done exactly in the order in which the touching proceeded. So here we have order according to procedure.

तथा ज्योतिष्टोमे औपवसथ्यमहरारभ्य क्रमेणानुष्ठेयानाम् अग्नीषोमीयसवनीयानुबन्ध्यानां पशूनां त्रयाणां साद्यस्क्राख्ये सोमयागे "सह पशूनालभेत" इत्येकदाऽनुष्ठानलक्षणं साहित्यं बोधितम्। तदपि सवनीयस्य स्थाने विहितम्। तत्र प्राकृतक्रमं परित्यज्य सवनीयस्य स्थाने साहित्यविधानादादौ सवनीयपशोरुपाकरणम्, ततोऽग्नीषोमीयस्य, ततोऽनुबन्ध्याया इति स्थानात् क्रमः। सुत्यादिवसात् पूर्वमहरौपवसथ्यम्।

Similarly, the three animals designated (respectively) as the one relating to the Fire and the Moon, the one relating to the pressing of the *soma* juice (*savanīya*), and the final one (*ānubandhya*), which are to be utilised in the Jyotiṣṭoma[1] sacrifice in succession beginning with the day of sojourn of the gods,[2] are understood from the sentence, "One should kill the animals together," to be together—that is, utilised in the performance at the same time—in the *soma*-sacrifice called Sādyaskra; and that, too, is (obviously) enjoined at the time allotted to the animal relating to the pressing of the *soma* juice. Here, inasmuch as the contiguity is (obviously) enjoined at this particular time, setting aside the order[3] of the typical sacrifice, therefore first the animal relating to the pressing of the *soma* juice is to be touched, then the animal relating to the Fire and the Moon, and lastly the final one. So this is order according to position. The day of sojourn of the gods is that preceding the day of the pressing of the *soma* juice.

[[1] 'Jyotiṣṭoma' is the general name of a group of *soma*-sacrifices in which the main function of offering *soma* juice thrice takes one day, and is preceded by four days of preliminaries. The typical sacrifice in this group is the Agniṣṭoma. Sometimes *soma*-sacrifices would extend for weeks and months, nay for a whole year or more.

[2] Which precedes that of the main sacrifice.

[3] In which one of the animals, viz., that relating to the Fire and the Moon, is to be killed on the fourth day, the second in the morning of the fifth or last day, and the third at the end of the sacrifice on that day.]

तथा दर्शे सान्नाय्यधर्माणां शाखाच्छेदादीनां पूर्वम्, आग्नेयधर्माणां निर्वापादीनाञ्च अनन्तरं प्रवृत्तावपि मुख्ययोराग्नेयसान्नाय्ययागयोर्मध्ये आग्नेययागस्य पूर्वमनुष्ठानान्मुख्ययागक्रमेणादावाग्नेयपुरोडाशस्य प्रयाजशेषाभिघारणम्, ततः पयसोऽभिघारणम् इति मुख्ययागक्रमादभिघारणक्रमः ।

इत्येवं श्रुत्यर्थ-पाठ-स्थान-मुख्य-प्रवृत्तिक्रमैरेव कर्मानुष्ठानम् । अन्यथाऽनुष्ठाने वैगुण्यमित्यलम् ।

इति श्रीकृष्णयज्वकृता मीमांसापरिभाषा समाप्ता ।

Likewise, in the new-moon sacrifice, although acts like the cutting of the *palāśa* (Butea Frondosa) branch, which are features of the curd and milk sacrifices, take place first, and acts like the setting apart (of handfuls of rice), which are features of the sacrifice to the Fire, take place next,[1] yet, inasmuch as between the two main sacrifices, viz., the sacrifice relating to the Fire and the curd and milk sacrifices, the former is performed first, therefore in accordance with the order of the principal sacrifices, the ghee left over after the Prayāja sacrifice is first poured on the cake relating to the Fire, and then on the milk. So here the order of pouring is according to that of the principal sacrifices.

Thus, rites are to be performed according to the order of direct assertion, purpose, reading, position, principal rite and procedure. Performance in any other manner will lead to defects.

Let us not proceed further.

[[1] Hence, according to the order of procedure, ghee should first be poured on the milk of the curd and milk sacrifices and then on the cake relating to the Fire. But the order according to the principal sacrifices reverses this.]

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